

# Public Opinion of Climate Migrants

## Understanding What Factors Trigger Anxiety or Support

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### Executive Summary

As climate change plays a growing role in how, when, and where people move, the question of how these migrants are received is increasingly important. At times, people moving due at least in part to disasters and climate change may elicit significant empathy. For instance, those forced to leave their homes by hurricanes and floods often enjoy a generous welcome in host communities, at least in the short term. But much of the migration spurred by climate and weather events lies in a fuzzy gray area, neither wholly voluntary nor wholly forced—as when drought or sea level rise gradually erodes livelihoods. In these cases, whether migrants will be welcomed is harder to predict, not least because the communities receiving them are often themselves dealing with climate shocks and resource scarcity.

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Given its unpredictability, climate mobility may trigger anxiety around immigration that is linked to a sense of disorder, unfairness, and loss of control. In turn, this anxiety can erode public support for both immigration and climate action. And without public

license, policymakers' ability to undertake creative and bold solutions becomes much narrower.

A review of polling and experimental data from around the world suggests that how climate mobility triggers solidarity versus opposition is neither straightforward nor unidirectional. Key findings include:

- ▶ **Climate migrants do not necessarily elicit more support or sympathy than other kinds of migrants.** Academics and advocates sometimes presume greater acceptance for people who are forced to move due to life-threatening circumstances and thus are seen as “not to blame” for their migration, but perceptions of who is forced to move vary. Many people who move at least in part due to slow-onset climate impacts (for instance, if lack of water degrades agricultural livelihoods over time), rather than sudden disasters (such as floods), may not be seen as blameless victims. This is borne out by the empirical evidence, which shows mixed results on whether public attitudes are more positive toward climate migrants than other migrants.
- ▶ **People displaced by visible, sudden-onset disasters may elicit significant solidarity in the short term—but this may not last.** Polling in refugee-hosting countries shows that many people support refugees when

they believe they will eventually return to their country of origin. While most disaster displacement is currently short term, there is growing evidence tying climate impacts with protracted displacement and permanent movement. If people worry that climate mobility will be massive and permanent (an idea that is perversely reinforced by alarmist narratives designed to mobilize climate action), this can increase anxiety.

- ▶ **It is the unpredictability of future climate mobility—rather than the numbers alone—that is likely to trigger public anxiety.** Publics tend to support immigration more when it is planned and orderly versus unanticipated and chaotic. But climate mobility is inherently hard to anticipate. The frequency, severity, and impacts of climate events have eluded even the most sophisticated forecasting models. And even perfect forecasting cannot predict whether people will adapt in place or migrate—and if they migrate, whether they will cross international borders.
- ▶ **Host communities' own struggles with climate-change impacts may make them less welcoming to migrants.** The fact that many migrants move to places that are themselves adversely affected by climate change and environmental degradation can be a source of tension that goes beyond the usual concerns around the distribution of resources between migrants and locals. For example, host communities struggling to adapt to floods and droughts may have less capacity or desire to welcome migrants, and they may feel resentment if international actors come in to support climate adaptation and resilience efforts that prioritize newcomers.

## BOX 1 What Are Narratives?

The building blocks of narratives are the stories people tell to help make sense of complex events. These stories shed light on how people view opportunities and threats, where they assign responsibility, and how they view potential solutions. Narratives, as the aggregate of these stories, generally offer a point of view on a complex issue (such as immigration or climate change) and can be developed and spread by various actors within a society (including politicians, institutions, civil society, and local communities). These narratives—such as those portraying immigrants as contributors, victims, or threats, and migration as orderly or chaotic—can shape how policies are designed, implemented, and received by the public.

For more information on migration narratives, see: Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, Haim Malka, and Shelly Culbertson, *How We Talk about Migration: The Link between Migration Narratives, Policy, and Power* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2021).

Efforts to increase support for potential climate migrants and to promote climate action often draw on three broad types of narratives, each of which has potential pitfalls. *Narratives of urgency*, which stress the potential scale of climate mobility, may heighten a sense of disorder and provoke panic or apathy (“apocalypse fatigue”). *Narratives of victimhood* attempt to create empathy with climate-displaced people. But since climate change, unlike other displacement drivers such as conflict, affects everyone (albeit unevenly), these narratives may unintentionally make people more worried about their own vulnerability rather than more sympathetic toward migrants. Finally, *positive narratives* of migration emphasize migrants’ ability to contribute to climate resilience or the green transition (e.g., making economies less carbon-intensive). But these narratives can ignore the potential strains migrants can place on host communities, and they can promise more than can be delivered—not least because of policy barriers that stymie efforts to capitalize on migration in the promised ways. Narratives that exaggerate

benefits without acknowledging costs can sound disingenuous and false.

Because of the risks inherent in these narratives, particularly in a time of high polarization around migration more broadly, policymakers should be strategic about whether, when, and how they raise the saliency of climate migration issues. Instead of invoking fear or emphasizing the vulnerability of climate-displaced people, they should promote practical actions the public can take to build communities that are both resilient and inclusive. And instead of simply promising that climate migrants can have a positive impact on a society, policymakers should work to prepare host communities to accommodate newcomers and to ensure that migration is safe, well-managed, and contributes to climate action. Fostering public understanding of climate migration as an important issue while mitigating anxiety about its impacts is difficult, but striking this balance is essential to good policy that supports both climate migrants and the communities in which they settle.

## 1 Introduction

Climate change and extreme weather events are predicted to dramatically alter patterns of human mobility around the world. The movement of people will become more unpredictable, greater in scale, and feature more displacement, whether internally or across borders (see Box 2). This poses an urgent policy question: How will communities receiving people displaced by disasters and climate impacts react to these newcomers? Lack of public support (or worse, public backlash) can put pressure on policymakers to curtail entry or reduce migrants' access to benefits, while strong public buy-in can enable policymakers to expand mobility options and take needed policy risks.

But public opinion is not always easy to predict, nor is it static or fixed. It ebbs and flows in response to

### BOX 2 What Is Climate Migration?

This brief uses “climate migration” and “climate mobility” interchangeably as umbrella terms to refer to all movement indirectly or directly triggered by environmental disasters and climate change, whether internal or cross-border, temporary or permanent. It is often difficult to directly attribute movement *only* to individual disasters (whether weather-related and potentially attributable to climate change, such as floods and storms, or geophysical, such as earthquakes) or slower-onset climate impacts (such as sea level rise). Instead, movement often happens because climate change compounds other drivers of migration, for instance by degrading livelihoods, worsening health issues, or exacerbating insecurity and conflict.

community priorities and values, intergroup dynamics, and external events—including how migration is portrayed by politicians and media outlets. While people can show incredible solidarity, even in the face of large-scale displacement (e.g., from Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela), the conditions under which migration occurs matter immensely. Migration can trigger anxiety, even when the number of people moving is relatively small, if arrivals are unexpected or perceived as chaotic or if host communities feel unprepared. Conversely, communities can rally to support even large displaced populations when moved by shared values or history, geopolitical calculations, or political pragmatism.<sup>1</sup>

How communities will react specifically to climate-related immigration is similarly difficult to predict. People who are generally more favorable to forced migrants than to economic migrants may be more welcoming of those displaced by climate and extreme weather events, though this is complicated by the degree to which receiving communities themselves feel insecure about their climate futures. Others may experience “apocalypse fatigue,” when the barrage of messages about the scale of the climate challenge leads to apathy or inaction.<sup>2</sup> And the

fact that climate change is global in nature, affecting all communities (though to different degrees), makes calculations around empathy and sacrifice more complex.

In some ways, the challenges posed by climate migration are similar to those resulting from other types of large-scale migration and sudden displacement. Rapid population change triggers known stressors, including pressure on housing, public services, infrastructure, and job markets. Any kind of immigration can raise questions of whether often-scarce resources are being distributed equitably, and can amplify friction around how these decisions are made. Yet in other ways, climate migration poses distinct challenges for host communities that require different tools to address. Climate-related movement is highly unpredictable, making it harder to prepare for and more likely that receiving communities feel caught off guard. And host communities are often facing their own climate-related challenges, potentially making them less able or willing to provide humanitarian support and integrate newcomers.

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This issue brief looks at what is known about public opinion of climate migrants, and what lessons can be gleaned from broader efforts to mitigate public anxiety and build welcoming communities in the context of rapid societal change. It reflects on the narratives and frames that create an environment that enables people to welcome climate migrants and policymakers to think creatively and long term about how to manage climate migration. It ends by offering recommendations on how to more effectively meet this challenge.

## 2 What Is Known about Public Opinion of Climate Migrants?

There is limited evidence to date on public opinion of climate migrants. The surveys and experiments on climate migration that do exist have produced mixed results: Some studies have found more public support for climate migrants than for economic migrants, while others have found similar levels of support for both. This divergence reflects the variety and robustness of the methodologies used as well as geographic differences. There is a need for more and better empirical evidence, but also recognition of the limitations to what can be learned from such surveys.

Some experiments have found a greater willingness to accept climate migrants than economic migrants, particularly in high-income countries. Nationally representative conjoint surveys<sup>3</sup> conducted in the United States and Germany found that respondents preferred migrants moving due to drought, flooding, or wildfires over economic migrants (though only by an average of 3.7 percentage points in the United States and 7.6 percentage points in Germany), but that both preferred refugees fleeing persecution over all other types of migrants.<sup>4</sup> An earlier survey in Denmark mirrored these results, showing that non-EU migrants moving due to climate-change-induced drought were more likely to be perceived as deserving of permanent residency than economic migrants and that refugees or people who could qualify for asylum were seen as the most deserving.<sup>5</sup>

Another experiment in Germany found higher support for a migrant moving because “his entire home country is becoming inhabitable due to soaring droughts” or “due to sea level rises,” than for those moving “due to the increasingly dire economic situation.”<sup>6</sup> In this experiment, where climate impacts are

described as threatening habitability, perceptions of climate migrants are similar to perceptions of those fleeing political persecution. Other surveys (albeit smaller and nonrepresentative) have found similar results: In Japan, a conjoint survey found greater support for refugees fleeing either disaster or war than for migrants coming to fill labor shortages,<sup>7</sup> while a survey experiment of university students in Austria found similar levels of support for those moving for climate and conflict reasons.<sup>8</sup>

In contrast, a study in Vietnam and Kenya showed the opposite—that climate and economic migrants enjoyed similar welcomes, and that both were similarly favored over “persecuted migrants.”<sup>9</sup> A study in New Zealand found that people felt more negatively toward climate migrants than immigrants in general, and that many thought climate migrants would integrate more poorly into receiving communities.<sup>10</sup> And in one experiment in Bangladesh, a strong majority of respondents said they would give to a charity providing health care for migrants, but support dropped 16 percent when people were asked specifically about climate migrants.<sup>11</sup> Interestingly, this preference for the generic category “migrants” over the specific category “climate migrants” held even among respondents who had themselves experienced flooding in the previous year. This shared experience did not increase their solidarity and empathy.

Even with robust methodologies, public opinion data and experiments have a limited ability to predict how communities will respond to actual climate- and disaster-related migration. Some of these limitations are fixable. Existing public opinion research on migration is biased toward the Global North, where surveys have long found that people are generally more sympathetic toward forced over voluntary migrants.<sup>12</sup> In low- and middle-income countries, the preference is sometimes flipped, since forced migrants can be seen as more of a burden than economic migrants.<sup>13</sup> Thus, even if climate-

and disaster-related migrants are seen as forced rather than voluntary migrants, they may still be received differently in high-income and in low- and middle-income countries, where most migration and displacement (both climate-related and not) occurs.<sup>14</sup>

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The broader challenge with using public opinion surveys is the lack of conceptual consensus or clarity about who a climate migrant is. In part, this is simply a problem of terminology—there is no legal category or migration pathway for “climate migrants” or “climate refugees” (unlike refugees, a group that is legally defined and that qualifies for distinct humanitarian pathways). Most people who use legal pathways to move for climate and economic reasons would also do so with the same types of visas. This means that surveys must ask people their opinion of an abstract category of migrants and introduce an artificial distinction between migrants who move in search of better economic opportunities and those who move because of climate and disaster events. In reality, climate and economic drivers are not mutually exclusive, and most people do not move solely for climate reasons.<sup>15</sup> For instance, massive floods in Pakistan in 2022 were associated with an increase in emigration, but this was largely because the floods came amidst an economic crisis.<sup>16</sup> For all of these reasons, and because most climate migrants do not self-identify as such, it is hard to know with confidence whether abstract support for this group would hold in response to actual migrant arrivals.

A related challenge is how language choice affects survey results. Because there is no official category of “climate migrants” or “economic migrants,” the way an experiment describes each group matters. For example, some experiments describe climate migrants as people moving because of floods, while others describe them as people moving because drought is making their country uninhabitable—these are not neatly comparable. Surveys also use different descriptions for economic and forced migrants. For example, a Danish study defined economic migrants as those who moved for “higher wages” and “better social benefits and welfare services,” descriptors that emphasize personal economic gain,<sup>17</sup> while a study in Japan used the wording “domestic labor shortages became serious, which could hurt economic growth,”<sup>18</sup> referring instead to the positive benefits of immigration for the receiving country’s economy. This diversity makes drawing generalizable conclusions from the scant literature difficult.

Similarly, many survey experiments do not distinguish between internal and international climate migrants, whereas public opinion on the two groups may be very different.<sup>19</sup> One experiment in the United States did find greater support for “internal climate refugees” than “international climate refugees,”<sup>20</sup> but this finding may not hold in other contexts. In addition, most studies that make a distinction between internal and international migrants only ask respondents about one or the other group, making it hard to draw conclusions about respondents’ relative views of the two groups and to compare the findings of different studies. Thus, it is possible that some of the conflicting data in this area stems from the fact that studies are actually testing attitudes toward different groups of migrants. In particular, this makes it hard to compare findings from different regions, as multiple studies have focused on internal migration in the Global South, while experiments in the Global North have tended to focus on international migration.

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More fundamentally, it is unclear whether trying to disaggregate public perceptions of migrants based on the reasons they move is a useful endeavor since the driver of migration is often not the most salient aspect for public opinion. The abovementioned surveys in Germany and Denmark that found greater support for climate than economic migrants also found that whether migrants were high- or low-skilled and whether they were proficient in the host-country language were often more important determinants of public support than whether they moved for climate or economic reasons. In Germany, for example, high-skilled migrants elicit a stronger preference than either political or climate migrants.<sup>21</sup> And in Denmark, there was lower support for granting permanent residency to migrants who were unemployed or Muslim (regardless of their reason for migration).<sup>22</sup> And even when people expressed support for “climate migrants” or “climate refugees,” that support dropped when people believed that accepting climate refugees would infringe on their own group’s economic wellbeing.<sup>23</sup>

In short, gauging public opinion on migration is not an exact science. The ways in which surveys are summarized and interpreted can flatten nuance, reducing people into binary categories such as economic versus climate migrants, which may not map fully onto the realities of how and why people move, and oversimplifying public attitudes into polarized categories of support versus opposition.

### 3 What Factors Trigger Public Anxiety or Support?

In reality, regardless of why people move, most host communities exhibit a range of attitudes. They can experience compassion for the plight of migrants or pride in their country's welcoming response, alongside fear, anxiety, or even panic over the potential for increasing crime, cultural change, or competition for scarce jobs. People may welcome newcomers initially, but start to resent them if their stay becomes protracted, just as they may readily support some pro-migrant policy choices (such as giving migrant children access to schools or expanding resettlement) while also desiring limits on whether and how people enter and stay in the country.

This section explores some of the factors behind people's attitudes toward climate migrants and offers hypotheses on what might promote feelings of welcome versus anxiety or resentment, acknowledging that these can coexist. It focuses on four broad categories: perceptions of how migration occurs (whether managed or uncontrolled), fairness and deservingness, the likely duration of migrants' stay, and security (economic, cultural, and physical).

#### A. *Predictability and Control*

People are much more likely to support migration if it is planned and predictable rather than spontaneous and disorderly, and if the pace does not exceed the community's capacity to prepare. Large-scale migration does not automatically trigger negative perceptions, and anxiety about migration can spike even when arrival numbers are relatively small—especially if there is a perception that migrants are breaking the rules and that elected leaders are not responding effectively. This was the case in the United States in 2014, when the unex-

pected arrival of 69,000 unaccompanied minors at the southern border triggered a political crisis and public backlash.<sup>24</sup> More than volume alone, people respond negatively when migration is unanticipated, unmanaged, and seen as unbounded (having no end in sight). Conversely, the public may accept the same number of migrants if they feel there are safeguards in place to prevent people from “gaming the system” and to ensure that migration is happening in an orderly manner.

In the context of climate migration, the key issue may thus not be how many people migrate but rather how they migrate. Indeed, the concern for policymakers should not be massive climate migration across borders (a prospect that can stoke fears but is unlikely because the vast majority of climate-related movements is internal<sup>25</sup>), but instead how climate change could trigger small and medium-sized, but unexpected and unbounded, inflows. Future climate mobility is likely to be highly unpredictable, for a few reasons. First, the occurrence, frequency, severity, and impacts of climate events are difficult to anticipate. Despite improvements, early warning and forecasting systems are not perfect, and being able to anticipate disasters does not always equate to having the resources or political will to prepare for them.<sup>26</sup> Second, human behavior is a wildcard: It is impossible to predict how a given climate impact will affect individuals' decisions about whether to migrate, especially because some will have better capacity to prepare and adapt than others.<sup>27</sup> Finally, it is incredibly hard to forecast how much climate migration will cross borders. A cyclone in one context might make people move to a nearby province, but in another context, it might cause them to move to another country. This cannot be easily modeled because government decisions to provide migration pathways (or to tighten border restrictions)—not simply individual preferences and capacities—will be determining factors in whether people cross borders.

It is precisely in situations like this, when migration feels out of control, or when communities have not had a chance to prepare, that opposition to newcomers can form. Even so, there are steps that can be taken to help prevent public opinion from turning against climate migrants. Helping people to adapt and prepare for climate shocks, and preparing border infrastructure and communities to support unexpected migrant arrivals, including those driven by unpredictable disasters, will be critical to safeguarding social license in the face of uncertainty.

## B. *Fairness and Deservingness*

Attribution of responsibility for migration can drive either support or opposition. As discussed earlier, many publics show greater support for people they believe have been forcibly displaced (often seen as blameless victims moving due to circumstances outside their control) than for those they believe have chosen to migrate (often seen as taking advantage or gaming the system),<sup>28</sup> though this is more true in the Global North than the Global South.

In the context of climate mobility, this distinction between forced and voluntary movement becomes even fuzzier. This is both because people moving due to climate change are generally not able to claim international protection,<sup>29</sup> and because decisions around whether to stay or go rarely hinge on one factor alone. For example, lack of rainfall in Honduras can be linked to increased emigration,<sup>30</sup> but that movement cannot be simply described as only forced or only voluntary. When lack of water makes agriculture untenable and farmers lose their livelihoods, some people may view those farmers as blameless victims (and some may even view them as deserving compensation because Honduras has not been a primary contributor to global emissions and thus to climate change; see Section 4.B.). Others may hold the view that agricultural workers could have taken greater responsibility for adapting to climate impacts, for instance by diversifying crops or im-

proving irrigation. Unlike in cases of identity-based persecution, there is no clear line between when climate change forces somebody to move and when they might still be able to stay. Nonetheless, climate change amplifies vulnerabilities and suffering that can make mobility the option of last resort, closer to displacement than a true choice.

Climate mobility can also complicate feelings of fairness around how resources are allocated in host communities. Climate change affects everybody, which on the one hand could boost host-community solidarity with climate migrants, but on the other hand risks heightening feelings of inequity if host communities are themselves dealing with the impacts of climate change and fear that newcomers will be prioritized over them in assistance programs. For instance, while there was great empathy in the United States for Hurricane Katrina evacuees, many community leaders expressed concern that evacuees were moving ahead of local people on lengthy waitlists for public assistance.<sup>31</sup>

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Therefore, it cannot be assumed that people will see climate- and disaster-related migrants as blameless victims deserving of protection. Survey experiment results have not shown a consistent difference between public support for people moving due to sudden-onset disasters (e.g., cyclones, which appear with little warning) and those moving because of slower-onset climate events (e.g., desertification and sea level rise, to which people theoretically have time to adapt).<sup>32</sup> Public opinion can also be malleable.

ble, and how policymakers, media outlets, and advocates frame climate- and disaster-related movement with regard to questions of responsibility may be key in shaping public support.

### C. *Expected Temporariness versus Permanence*

Solidarity is difficult to sustain over time. In many crises, public support for displaced people is highest when receiving communities believe that newcomers will eventually return home. Thus, even when solidarity blooms initially (as seen with Venezuelans in Colombia, Syrians in Turkey, and Ukrainians across Europe<sup>33</sup>), open-ended welcomes tend to fade as practical concerns about economics, security, or even cultural change come to the forefront and people begin to resent the open-ended sacrifice asked of them. For example, part of the reason refugees fleeing Syria to Turkey beginning in 2011 were long welcomed was because most Turks believed they would return home; by 2021, only 2.4 percent of Turks still believed this and significant negative attitudes were emerging as people realized that Syrian “guests” had become permanent.<sup>34</sup>

It is unknown whether current and future climate events will trigger short-term or long-term migration, let alone whether publics will perceive these movements as temporary or permanent. In theory, people displaced by disasters such as hurricanes or floods and seen as only seeking temporary refuge should be welcomed more favorably, while those displaced by slow-onset events (such as sea level rise) may be seen as needing permanent (and thus more costly) accommodations because their homes have become unlivable and face more resistance. But climate change is increasingly blurring the boundaries between temporary and permanent displacement.

While disaster displacement is for now mostly temporary, recurrent disasters could lead to recurrent or long-term migration, or a mix of the two. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre data on disaster-related internal displacement show that the number of displacements that occur each year dwarfs the number of people who remain internally displaced at the end of each year, indicating that while many people are displaced, most return home at some point.<sup>35</sup> This same trend can be seen in national data in the United States.<sup>36</sup> Yet some disasters do cause sizable long-term displacement. Mid-2022 floods in Pakistan caused massive internal displacement, and although the majority had returned home by mid-2023, more than 1 million Pakistanis remained internally displaced in Sindh province alone.<sup>37</sup> There is an empirical knowledge gap about the conditions under which climate change and disasters are likely to trigger long-term migration, and added uncertainty about whether the public will perceive these movements as temporary or permanent.

### D. *Feelings of Insecurity*

Anxieties about the impacts of migration tend to coalesce around three types of insecurities: competition for jobs and resources, increased violence or crime, and changes to culture or social norms. These fears are generally expressed in personal terms—whether people think they or their family members are more or less likely to lose their jobs, fall victim to crime, or lose their identity—whereas data on immigration is usually shared in broad metrics that have less emotional resonance. This is why fears about the potential negative impacts of immigration can persist despite evidence showing its neutral or positive impacts. In Colombia, for example, surveys show that crime is one of the top drivers of anxiety around Venezuelans (along with jobs and wages), even though research clearly shows that Venezuelans displaced across Latin America do not commit crimes at higher rates than natives.<sup>38</sup> Part of the reason facts and hard data are so readily dismissed is that they

often tell a story of averages across the whole population, whereas impacts are experienced individually and accrue disproportionately to certain groups (for instance, border communities or cities hosting large migrant populations).

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In some ways, climate-induced movements are no different than other types of migration in terms of the types of insecurity they can trigger. One study in Germany found that host communities are most supportive of climate migrants when told that “relatively small” numbers would come and that support would be proportional to Germany’s “financial means, size of the country, and past migration acceptance rates.” In contrast, support was lower when respondents were told that support would be “proportional to [Germany’s significant] environmental responsibility for climate change”—a potentially large number, considering the country’s large historic emissions. This underscores that people are sensitive both to uncertainty and to concerns about their community’s capacity to respond.<sup>39</sup> A study in Bangladesh found greater opposition to climate migrants among the more educated and wealthy—possibly because they expected to shoulder more of the economic costs of future migration, for instance through increases in taxes.<sup>40</sup> Another study, conducted in New Zealand, similarly found that individuals were more opposed to accepting climate refugees when they believed this would infringe on their own group’s economic wellbeing.<sup>41</sup> These results, while not universal, shed some light on how host communities may filter calculations of immigration’s costs and benefits through their projected personal outcomes.

The unpredictability and potential scale and speed of movement related to climate change may in some contexts trigger heightened fears. Impacts from climate change (such as more frequent, more severe weather events) are likely to compound migration to cities, straining infrastructure and services in urban peripheries. The mayor of Dhaka North, for example, has estimated that 2,000 people arrive each day from other climate-affected areas in Bangladesh.<sup>42</sup> Studies from Bangladesh have found that climate migrants may strain job markets, housing, and food security in host communities.<sup>43</sup>

Moreover, many climate migrants will move to places that are themselves adversely affected by climate change and environmental degradation, potentially exacerbating tensions around how increasingly scarce resources will be distributed. This can cause particular strain in urban areas already struggling to adapt to large population increases.<sup>44</sup> For instance, researchers estimate that migrants will continue to move to seek jobs in Bangladesh’s coastal cities, despite these destinations being highly vulnerable to climate impacts including sea level rise<sup>45</sup> and thus already experiencing added strain and potentially reduced capacity or desire to welcome migrants. Some communities may also feel resentment if international actors establish projects to support climate adaptation and resilience for newcomers without offering comparable support to long-term residents. One experiment in Bangladesh, for instance, found that urban residents who had experienced floods were not more welcoming of internal climate migrants.<sup>46</sup> This implies that having personally experienced climate shocks may at times reduce support for others in similar situations, instead of building solidarity (although research in the United States has found contrary results<sup>47</sup>). In order to secure public support, policymakers need to understand the complex, overlapping dynamics at play in host communities that can increase feelings of insecurity and decrease solidarity, and address these head on.

## 4 Climate Migration Narratives

How leaders talk about climate migration can shape how the public views policy actions, including whether they support climate action or expanding legal migration pathways for climate-affected people. Existing narratives on climate migration tend to cluster around three frames to mobilize action: those that emphasize the urgency of climate change, the victimhood of migrants, and the potential benefits of migration. Drawing on a combination of social psychology and crisis communications research, as well as message testing experiments where available, this section analyzes whether and how each type of narrative is likely to mobilize constructive policy actions.

### A. Narratives of Urgency

Various media outlets, governments, and nongovernmental organizations have published dire warnings of the consequences of unmitigated climate change, including predictions that hundreds of millions of people are likely to be displaced. These rather apocalyptic narratives aim to highlight the gravity of climate change in order to galvanize climate action. Often, they are used with the goal of encouraging investments in climate mitigation and adaptation or expanding legal migration pathways for the climate vulnerable. But do these narratives achieve their goals?

A few studies have sought to gauge whether awareness of climate migration leads to increased support for climate action, either at home or abroad. Experiments and studies in the United States have found that priming people to consider climate migration can strengthen support for climate action.<sup>48</sup> For instance, respondents who listened to a podcast

with information and personal stories about climate migration were slightly more supportive of climate mitigation policies.<sup>49</sup>

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Other studies have found that highlighting climate migration makes respondents less likely to support climate action. One study in the United States and Germany found no evidence that highlighting either climate migration or climate change increased support for policies to mitigate their effects.<sup>50</sup> Another experiment in China, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States found that linking climate change with forced migration lowered support for climate mitigation measures in all countries and across respondents of different characteristics (age, gender, education, income, employment status, and level of concern for climate change).<sup>51</sup> Similar experiments have thus yielded different results on how highlighting climate migration affects support for climate action, making it difficult to draw conclusions.

Moreover, while most people state a desire for climate action in the abstract, this does not always translate into willingness to make personal sacrifices. A survey in six European countries found that just 27 percent of people expect climate-change solutions to benefit them personally.<sup>52</sup> In New Zealand, a study found that while two-thirds of respondents were in favor of increasing foreign aid for countries affected by climate change, only slightly more than one-third agreed their country should pay to build sea walls in low-lying coastal nations. One explanation is that

naming a specific project (rather than making a generic reference to foreign aid) can trigger respondents to think about the specific costs of the project and the possibility that money to pay for it would be taken away from their local communities.<sup>53</sup>

There are other limitations to using narratives of urgency to promote climate action or expanded migration pathways. By painting a picture of impending disaster—often a hyperbolic one, citing the worst-case scenario without accounting for potential mitigation and at times poorly evidenced—these narratives run several risks:

► **Mass migration narratives can backfire by evoking a sense of disorder and threat in receiving societies, feeding into fears of uncontrolled movement.**

Surveys in the United States have found that “discussions of climate migration seem to increase Americans’ (especially Democrats’) perception that migration is risky compared to not discussing this topic,”<sup>54</sup> and that this can provoke a nativist response.<sup>55</sup> Fears about climate migration are already being invoked by far-right politicians amid debates on shuttering migration pathways,<sup>56</sup> and public opinion surveys have begun to show increased concern about “mass migration as a result of climate change.”<sup>57</sup>

► **Predicting mass migration may invoke a sense of inevitability that in some cases may make people more likely to move.** One meta-analysis identified five studies finding that perceptions of rainfall fluctuations or increased floods “contribute to migration decisions even when they are *not* supported by existing data, suggesting that perceptions on their own can influence migration.”<sup>58</sup> Thus, there is a risk that when people hear predictions of mass migration, they overestimate the inevitability of their

own need to migrate due to climate change. In surveys, 29 percent of Europeans (and 48 percent of young Europeans) said they anticipate being forced to move to another country because of climate change, while 54 percent of respondents in Latin America anticipated moving to another region or country due to climate change.<sup>59</sup> Alarmist narratives could feed into these perceptions.

► **Narratives emphasizing the urgency of climate challenges may lead to what some social scientists have dubbed “apocalypse fatigue.”** That is, the challenge of climate change can feel so big and unmanageable that people cope by disconnecting rather than engaging with solutions.<sup>60</sup> This suggests that efforts to mobilize climate action solely through pessimism could lead to apathy and defeatism rather than action.<sup>61</sup> Indeed, a barrage of information on climate-induced displacement has in some cases curtailed responses, indicating that there is a risk that host communities may feel overwhelmed by the scale of needs and be less open to sharing resources, public services, and livelihoods, especially if combatting climate change feels out of reach.<sup>62</sup>

## *B. Narratives of Victimhood*

If the prevailing narrative is often apocalyptic, its sister narrative is one that portrays migrants as victims. This narrative aims to foster public support by saying that people are displaced for reasons beyond their control. (In the climate-change context, this could be because they come from countries that did little to contribute to climate change yet bear the brunt of it, or because their own governments did not mitigate climate harms.) The premise is that if receiving communities are more welcoming of individuals forced to move, then making clear that people did not choose to migrate could foster public

support—though in reality, painting migrants as deserving has had mixed results (see Section 3.B).<sup>63</sup>

These narratives emerge from climate justice and migrant justice movements, which argue that the countries that have historically polluted the most have a moral obligation to take in those harmed by emissions and forced to move. Long promoted by activists, this idea has now been taken up in international policy discussions on “loss and damage,” the concept that rich, polluting countries should compensate poor countries that have produced relatively few emissions. It inched closer to reality with the agreement to establish the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage to support the communities hardest hit by climate change, reached in 2022 at the 27th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 27) and operationalized the following year at COP 28. Progress on this issue has breathed new life into the global policy discourse on climate displacement, even as governments continue to resist calls to scale up loss and damage funding and to take formal responsibility for compensating climate “victims.”<sup>64</sup>

At the local level, narratives of victimhood do not always increase public support for climate migrants. Risks include the following:

- ▶ **Narratives that try to evoke sympathy for climate-displaced migrants can instead remind host communities of their own climate vulnerability.** Unlike other drivers of forced displacement, such as civil war or identity-based persecution, climate change affects everybody. Climate-displaced people also often move to nearby areas that may face similar threats. Thus, highlighting the severity of climate change and how little control climate migrants had over their movement could heighten host communities’ concerns about their own climate vulnerability. Emphasizing the particular vulnerability of

climate migrants could also seem inequitable to host communities that are also vulnerable to disasters and climate impacts, especially if they are asked to share limited resources.

- ▶ **Highlighting climate migrants’ blamelessness does not necessarily increase feelings of responsibility for them in host communities.** Most communities hosting migrants and refugees are in low- and middle-income countries that have historically contributed very little to climate change, and thus may also view themselves as blameless. For example, the average person in Nairobi, Kenya, arguably bears little responsibility for the climate-change-related droughts that drive people across East Africa to move to the city. One study in Bangladesh found that narratives blaming outside forces (natural disasters and government inaction) for migration did not lead to more willingness to accommodate the displaced.<sup>65</sup> And because the countries with the greatest responsibility for global warming (high-income countries) are unlikely to let the majority of climate-vulnerable people enter (which by this logic would be their “fair share”), the unequitable burden on low- and middle-income host communities could undermine public support for migrants in these countries.

The climate justice movement has correctly pointed out that the communities worst hit by the impacts of climate change tend to have contributed least to global warming, and in doing so, achieved a landmark victory in the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage. Still, simplistic efforts to apply these justice principles to promote solidarity and welcome for climate migrants can fail to resonate with the general public, or worse exacerbate concerns and anxieties about dealing with the dual challenges of climate change and hosting migrants.

## C. *Positive Narratives*

Another, less common set of climate migration narratives seeks to flip the script and focus on how migrants can positively contribute to climate adaptation and mitigation. This broader idea is neither new nor unique to climate migration; efforts to frame migrants as agents of change and development have been ongoing for at least a decade. Some studies have found that presenting people with information on migrants' positive contributions to a society leads to more positive reported attitudes.<sup>66</sup> But there is a chance these types of efforts can backfire, as people can be moved to defend their existing beliefs even more strongly when given evidence against them.<sup>67</sup> Outside of small experiments, however, there is limited evidence on whether these narratives have the potential to shift public opinion on migration, and how generalizable and durable any such shifts may be.

Efforts to reframe migration narratives in a more positive light have extended to climate mobility—highlighting, for example, stories of diaspora remittances providing an essential lifeline after a disaster, migrants working on the frontlines of disaster preparedness and response, and migrant entrepreneurs and workers playing a critical role in the transition away from fossil fuels and toward a green economy. The question is how to boost these narratives' ability to build support for climate migrants while avoiding any backfire effect. Risks include the following:

- ▶ **Positive narratives are often exaggerated or overgeneralized, which can undermine their credibility.** Diaspora remittances are private funds sent to friends and family, and they are normally used for food and education rather than building climate resilience (e.g., by planting more diversified crops or elevating houses). They usually increase after a disaster, but not always, and emergency remittances are usually

used to meet immediate humanitarian needs rather than for broader adaptation strategies. Similarly, migrants do work in green jobs, but they are not a panacea for labor shortages in the green economy. Often, the skills needed simply do not exist, and immigration should not replace other policy options for addressing such skills shortages, including training local workers. Migrants can contribute to climate action, but exaggerating their potential contributions can set expectations too high (and then undermine support if these expectations are not met).

- ▶ **These narratives fail to acknowledge the costs of migration for host communities.** Positive narratives that do not acknowledge visible costs (such as reduced housing supply, overstretched public services, or competition for jobs) can appear disingenuous to host communities. Specifically, talking about climate migration solely as a net positive can backfire if this does not cohere with how people experience it, or if it dismisses their genuine concerns about the future. The key is to find ways to adequately prepare for migration, for instance by building sufficient shelter and housing to avoid surging prices or homelessness and by ensuring that investments and funding to support migrants also help host communities (e.g., by including both in job training programs). Communication campaigns to show that host communities benefit from this funding may also be able to increase public support for migrants and refugees.<sup>68</sup>
- ▶ **Positive stories sometimes gloss over the potential risks and costs to migrants themselves.** For instance, migrant workers appear to often be at the forefront of disaster relief (although there is limited non-

anecdotal data on the extent of this) and jobs in renewable energy manufacturing and distribution. But some of these jobs, for instance those in construction or solar panel installation, are often unsafe, insecure, and poorly paid. Indeed, many civil-society organizations refute the idea that migration can be a positive strategy for climate adaptation, arguing that this undervalues the fact that climate change has forced people to move.<sup>69</sup>

Communicators should thus balance positive, inspiring narratives with realistic messaging reflecting the many shades of gray inherent to migration, including that it will also accrue costs (and that these costs will be felt unevenly). While it is important to speak about migration as a potential catalyst of the green transition, it is even more important to address the real policy and practical limitations that might stand in the way of this. Policymakers would do well to focus on the changes needed to facilitate migrants' concrete contributions to climate action (for instance, ensuring that migrants have work permits that would enable them to do the types of work this would involve). Once this enabling environment is in place, communicating the real positive impacts migrants make, and ensuring that these do not get lost in the general anxiety and apathy about migration, may be able to foster public support.

## 5 Conclusions and Recommendations

Although communities have shown a remarkable ability to welcome people who have been forcibly displaced, whether by conflict as in Ukraine and Syria or by environmental disasters such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti,<sup>70</sup> policymakers cannot count on blanket support for even the most sympathetic or vulnerable group. And even where communities are predisposed to welcome climate migrants, this

support must be nurtured if it is to be sustained, and points of friction or insecurity must be proactively identified if they are to be effectively addressed. Some surveys indicate that, at least in theory, many publics are inclined to support people displaced by climate events. But the reality of climate mobility may create anxiety and resistance in practice, especially if migration occurs in unpredictable ways, lasts longer than expected, and creates burdens for host communities that they consider unfair. Building public support and anticipating the pain points that could undermine it are critical in a warming world.

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*Even where communities are predisposed to welcome climate migrants, this support must be nurtured if it is to be sustained, and points of friction or insecurity must be proactively identified if they are to be effectively addressed.*

In order to maintain the social license needed to effectively manage climate-related movements and promote climate action, policymakers could consider the following recommendations:

- 1 **Be strategic about whether to engage in climate migration narratives at all.** Given the prevalence of alarmist narratives warning that millions of people will be displaced (to the Global North) by climate change, policymakers and others should be cautious about whether bringing climate change into the public discourse on migration is worth the risks. These narratives are often well intentioned, but they can heighten feelings of disorder, exacerbate anti-immigrant sentiment, or lead to apathy. Climate migration has become a buzzword in migration policy, and while this opens up

space for policy reform, not all migration communications and policy discussions need to be linked to climate change, especially if this is more likely to alienate audiences rather than encourage action. Messaging should situate the challenge of adapting to and mitigating climate change in a broader context that does not foment panic around the relatively small number of people crossing international borders.

- 2 **Mobilize action by recommending practical steps people can take, rather than by assigning blame.** The climate justice movement makes the valid argument that the countries most vulnerable to climate impacts are not those that contributed the most to climate change. But not everyone agrees that, as a result, high-income polluting countries should pay to mitigate climate-change effects, compensate for climate-related loss and damage, and provide new migration pathways for climate-displaced people. There are also risks to focusing on blame: It can trigger a sense of defensiveness rather than a change in attitudes and behavior, and it can undermine the willingness of host communities in low- and middle-income countries (which are themselves often climate vulnerable) to support and integrate displaced people. Instead, policymakers and advocates should focus on positive next steps, and break them down into bite-sized actions that are relatively easy to implement.
- 3 **Be realistic about both the costs and the benefits that migration brings.** Migration can make an important contribution to climate action—by reducing pressure on hard-hit host communities struggling to adapt to climate change and environmental degradation, by contributing labor to growing green industries, and by sending

remittances to disaster-affected home communities. But narratives about these benefits are often exaggerated, which undermines their credibility. Migration policies do not currently work well enough to enable people to move for jobs in the green economy, except at small scale and with extensive investments in upskilling. Without the right enabling environment for migrant contributions to climate action, it is better to temper people's expectations from the beginning than to overpromise and underdeliver. Welcoming significant numbers of migrants and displaced people (or transforming economies and societies to cut emissions and adapt to climate change) will entail costs, and it is important to acknowledge these up front to avoid alienating members of the public who have genuine concerns.

- 4 **Help communities to prepare for immigration with investments that benefit migrants and locals alike.** If people perceive, rightly or wrongly, that migrants receive special treatment that is not available to local residents, resentment and anxieties will build. New arrivals may need support (e.g., to find housing, meet basic needs, and address psychosocial and other vulnerabilities), but this should be provided equitably—that is, combined with support for disadvantaged members of host communities, especially groups negatively affected by migrant arrivals. Strategic communications alone cannot convince people to welcome climate migrants if host communities feel that the newcomers may be prioritized for services or compete for scarce resources. Thus, efforts to build solidarity should rely on improving local resilience systems in a way that lifts all boats, helping migrants and host communities alike to adapt to climate change.

The intersection of climate and environmental change with migration and displacement is still a relatively new topic for policymakers and the general public. The rapid growth in the visibility of climate mobility has opened opportunities for advocates, policymakers, researchers, and practitioners to advance their policy goals in both areas—climate action and migration policy. While efforts in this area are generally well intentioned, there are risks involved in bringing climate into the migration nar-

rative and vice versa. And yet, there is a real need to enhance public understanding of this issue, not least to ensure that public anxieties about climate migration do not form, harden, and constrain opportunities for smart policymaking. There is space for pragmatic and bold narrative interventions on climate mobility, as long as these messages are communicated strategically and accompanied by practical, on-the-ground initiatives to support both migrants and host communities.

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*There is a real need to enhance public understanding of this issue, not least to ensure that public anxieties about climate migration do not form, harden, and constrain opportunities for smart policymaking.*

## Endnotes

- 1 See Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, M. Murat Erdoğan, and Lucía Salgado, *Confronting Compassion Fatigue: Understanding the Arc of Public Support for Displaced Populations in Turkey, Colombia, and Europe* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2024).
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- 3 Conjoint survey designs randomly assign respondents to different hypothetical migrant profiles across a range of criteria, for instance by giving respondents scenarios where migrants have moved for different reasons, come from different countries of origin, or have different demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, host-country language skills, occupation, or religious background). With surveys designed in this way, researchers can disaggregate how people’s perceptions of migrants differ by scenario and thus determine which criteria affect public reactions to migration.
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- 8 Karla Henning, Ivo Steimanis, and Björn Volla, “(Climate) Migrants Welcome? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Austria,” *Regional Environmental Change* 22, no. 108 (2022). See also Samantha K. Stanley and Jessica Williamson, “Attitudes towards Climate Change Aid and Climate Refugees in New Zealand: An Exploration of Policy Support and Ideological Barriers,” *Environmental Politics*, 30, no. 7 (2021): 1259–1280.
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- 10 Olivia E. T. Yates, Sam Manuela, Andreas Neef, and Shiloh Groot, “Attitudes towards Climate Migrants in Aotearoa New Zealand: The Roles of Climate Change Beliefs and Immigration Attitudes,” *Regional Environmental Change* 22, no. 88 (2022).
- 11 Rachel Castellano, Nives Dolšak, and Aseem Prakash, “Willingness to Help Climate Migrants: A Survey Experiment in the Korail Slum of Dhaka, Bangladesh,” *PLOS One* 16, no. 4 (2021).
- 12 For example, in a 2018 Pew Research Center survey conducted in 18 countries, 71 percent of respondents said they supported taking in people fleeing violence and war, while 50 percent said they supported “more” or “about the same” number of immigrants moving to their country. See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera and Phillip Connor, *Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength than a Burden* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2019).
- 13 This pattern has been observed in Central and Eastern Europe, parts of Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. For instance, in a survey done in Slovakia in 2018–19, respondents rated “refugees” less favorably than “migrants” or “foreigners.” In Japan, more people favored admission of immigrants than admission of refugees (81 percent versus 69 percent), with economic migrants potentially seen as more able to contribute in light of the country’s shrinking population. And the Gallup Migrant Acceptance Index reveals that negative attitudes are concentrated in countries shouldering a disproportionate burden for welcoming the world’s migrants and refugees. Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador (the top three host countries of Venezuelans) showed the sharpest declines in migrant acceptance of all countries surveyed between 2016 and 2019. See Andrej Findor, Matej Hruška, Petra Jankovská, and Michaela Pobudová, “Re-Examining Public Opinion Preferences for Migrant Categorizations: ‘Refugees’ Are Evaluated More Negatively than ‘Migrants’ and ‘Foreigners’ Related to Participants’ Direct, Extended, and Mass-Mediated Intergroup Contact Experiences,” *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 80 (2021): 262–273; Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, and Anita Pugliese, “World Grows Less Accepting of Migrants,” Gallup, September 23, 2020; Gonzalez-Barrera and Connor, *Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength than a Burden*.
- 14 Viviane Clement et al., *Groundswell Part 2: Acting on Internal Climate Migration* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2021).
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- 16 Meghan Benton, Lawrence Huang, Jeanne Batalova, and Tino Tirado, *The State of Global Mobility in the Aftermath of the COVID-19 Pandemic* (Washington, DC, and Geneva: Migration Policy Institute and International Organization for Migration, 2024).
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- 18 Fraser and Murakami, “The Role of Humanitarianism.”
- 19 The distinction between internal and international migrants can be significant. Internal climate migrants may pose less of a threat in terms of cultural change (though this may not be the case if they belong to an ethnic minority, immigrant-origin, or otherwise marginalized group). On the other hand, they may not trigger the same solidarity or compassion as, for example, international migrants displaced by persecution or conflict, precisely because climate change is so ubiquitous. The plight of internally climate-displaced groups may also trigger anxiety in people who are anxious about the future effects of climate change on their own lives. And perceived competition for resources and insecurity can be triggered regardless of the newcomers’ origins.

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- 21 Helbling, "Attitudes towards Climate Change Migrants."
- 22 Hedegaard, "Attitudes to Climate Migrants."
- 23 Helbling, "Attitudes towards Climate Change Migrants"; Stanley and Williamson, "Attitudes towards Climate Change Aid."
- 24 Muzaffar Chishti, Faye Hipsman, Bonnie Bui, "The Stalemate over Unaccompanied Minors Holds Far-Reaching Implications for Broader U.S. Immigration Debates," *Migration Information Source*, August 15, 2014; Marc R. Rosenblum, *Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United States: The Tension between Protection and Prevention* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015).
- 25 Lawrence Huang, "Climate Migration 101: An Explainer," *Migration Information Source*, November 16, 2023.
- 26 The deadly flooding in Germany's Ahr Valley in July 2021, for example, was predicted with enough time for residents to evacuate, but the warnings were not taken seriously. See Katrin Bennhold, "After Deadly Floods, a German Village Rethinks Its Relationship to Nature," *New York Times*, August 6, 2021.
- 27 For example, the behavior of the first movers may influence how family and friends left behind adapt to the same climate stressors. One study examining climate-related migration from Mexico to the United States showed that when a critical mass of the community left, migrant networks provided information and resources (including remittances) that increased in situ adaptive capacity and thus could *reduce* the likelihood of future migration because of similar weather events. See Raphael J. Nawrotzki, Fernando Riosmena, Lori M. Hunter, and Daniel M. Runfola, "Amplification or Suppression: Social Networks and the Climate Change–Migration Association in Rural Mexico," *Global Environmental Change* 35 (2015): 463–474.
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- 29 Samuel Davidoff-Gore and Lawrence Huang, *Displacement and International Protection in a Warming World* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming).
- 30 Sarah Bermeo and David Leblang, "Honduras Migration: Climate Change, Violence, & Assistance" (policy brief, Duke University Centre for International Development, March 2021).
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- 32 For instance, one study finds no significant within-sample differences in respondent preferences between drought, flooding, or wildfires as reasons for migration in experiments in the United States and Germany, suggesting that different climate-related drivers of migration tend to be viewed similarly. In the United States, migrants displaced by droughts, floods, and wildfires are respectively 3.5, 3.7, and 4 percentage points more likely to be preferred than economic migrants; and in the German sample, these groups are preferred by 8.1, 8.6, and 6 percentage points, respectively. See Arias and Blair, "Changing Tides."
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- 44 There is no evidence that climate-induced forced displacement will cause any more conflict than other forms of displacement and migration. Studies in Bangladesh have found that climate-related migration is less likely than other forms of migration to increase protests and conflict—and indeed, because most climate displacement is internal, certain challenges to social cohesion may be more muted if the migrants and host communities share linguistic, ethnic, or religious backgrounds, or if they have the same legal rights to jobs and services. See Kristina Petrova, "Natural Hazards, Internal Migration and Protests in Bangladesh," *Journal of Peace Research* 58, no. 1 (2021): 33–48; Davis, Bhattachan, D'Odorico, and Suweis, "A Universal Model."

- 45 Andrew Bell et al., “Migration towards Bangladesh Coastlines Projected to Increase with Sea-Level Rise through 2100,” *Environmental Research Letters* 16 (2021).
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- 49 Kaitlin T. Raimi et al., “Effects of Communicating the Rise of Climate Migration on Public Perceptions of Climate Change and Migration,” *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 93 (2024).
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- 51 Niheer Dasandi et al., “Positive, Global, and Health or Environment Framing Bolsters Public Support for Climate Policies,” *Communications Earth and Environment* 3, no. 239 (2022).
- 52 Stephen Hawkins and Arisa Kimaram, *Navigating Climate Change in Europe: The Choices Ahead* (N.p.: More in Common, 2022).
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- 54 Raimi et al., “Effects of Communicating.”
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- 64 See Steven Miron, “Loss and Damage and Human Mobility at COP 28: An Emerging Architecture to Avert, Minimize and Address Displacement?” Refugee Law Initiative blog, December 19, 2023; Lorenzo Guadagno, “How to Quantify and Measure Loss and Damage Associated with Displacement?” (brief, Loss and Damage and the Challenges of Human Mobility and Displacement Working Group the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, May 2024).
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