Towards a Global Compact for Migration:
A Development Perspective

A Series to Inform the Debate

July 2018 Issue No. 4

Mind the Gap

Bringing Migration into Development Partnerships and Vice Versa

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Executive Summary

The 2014 surge in unaccompanied children arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border, the 2015–16 migration crisis in Europe, and other recent spikes in irregular migration have prompted many destination-country governments to look beyond border management for ways to address the underlying drivers of such movements. Governments have committed large sums to these efforts, including the 3.2 billion euros policymakers committed for the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa at the Valetta Summit in November 2015 and the U.S. decision to commit USD 750 million for the Alliance for Prosperity in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in fiscal year 2016. In short, policymakers are thinking about how they can incorporate migration into development programming and vice versa.

Greater collaboration between migration-management and development actors carries some clear benefits. The ability of governments to address factors that drive displacement and migration, such as instability and limited economic opportunities, hinges on the support, knowledge, and resources of development actors. For example, the Joint Valletta Action Plan signed by European and African heads of state sets out an ambitious agenda for tackling the drivers of migration and displacement, promoting legal migration, improving protection for those in need, disrupting human trafficking and smuggling, and improving returns and reintegration. The ability of signatory states to follow through on these commitments will depend both on European development budgets, which provide most of the financing for the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, and on development actors' expertise in partnering constructively with developing countries. In turn, migration is becoming a growing priority in development work, reflecting both the events of recent years and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development's recognition that migration can make important contributions to development.

But coordinating the work of development and migration-management actors in partnerships with countries of origin comes with risks. Recent migration partnerships have focused

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heavily on tackling irregular migration and effecting returns of unauthorized migrants. These priorities can be sensitive subjects for partner countries—particularly those that rely on remittances from their diasporas and have not been able to spur adequate domestic job creation—and they may undermine development cooperation in other areas, including the core mission of poverty alleviation. The divergent approaches migration-management and development actors take to establishing and managing partnerships present another challenge. While development agencies have long sought to mitigate the power imbalance between donor and recipient countries, some migration-management actors see this asymmetry as an opportunity to enforce support for their priorities. A "more-for-more" approach uses increased assistance to reward countries that make progress on migration goals—and, more recently, a "less-for-less" approach foresees reductions for countries that do not. Such transactional strategies stand in sharp contrast to the partnership approach that characterizes most development cooperation, and they may risk further destabilizing fragile states and undermining development priorities.

Despite these challenges, cooperation between development and migration-management actors on common priorities could add value in several areas. For example, addressing barriers to economic growth is a long-held priority for development actors that can benefit from the growing input and funding from other government departments and the private sector. These additional sources of support and expertise present new opportunities to address economic development more comprehensively, including by improving investment conditions in priority countries, boosting access to concessional financing for middle-income countries, and addressing trade barriers. Resilience-building in origin or transit countries is another priority of development agencies; it too could benefit from the experience and resources of agencies working on capacities such as policy implementation, crisis response, and labor-market regulation, which could have an impact on migration dynamics. A third area is facilitation of skilled migration and the effective transfer of skills as tools for economic growth, with initiatives striving to create a "triple win" in which migrants, origin countries, and destination countries all benefit from migration.

In order to reap the benefits of greater coordination between development and migration-management actors—from sharing expertise to realizing economies of scale—policymakers must first tackle the challenges that have kept these two fields apart. Successful cooperation lies in setting mutually agreed goals for cooperation that balance development and migration priorities and in establishing realistic expectations about the likely outcomes and the timeline for results.

I. Introduction

The 2015–16 migration and refugee crises in Europe and elsewhere have prompted many destination-country governments to look beyond the measures necessary to deter, or to receive and integrate, new arrivals. New policy thinking has increasingly focused on assessing where and how governments should invest to address the structural factors, such as weak governance and economic stagnation, that drive irregular migration in the first place. As a result, there has been a renewed push to incorporate migration aims into development programming, and vice versa.

This shift can be seen in a range of destination countries and regions. In an October 2015 address to the European Parliament, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for Europe to "tailor our foreign and development policy far more closely to the goals of resolving conflicts and combating the factors that cause people to flee their homes," and to increase funding for these goals.[1] The following month, at the Valletta Summit, European and African leaders launched the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which has to date pooled 3.4 billion euros in EU and national funds to address the drivers of migration from Africa to Europe.[2]

In the same period, the Obama administration committed USD 750 million from the U.S. budget for fiscal year 2016 to support the Alliance for Prosperity in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras as part of its broader response to a resurgence of unauthorized migration from these countries—consisting primarily of children and families—across the southern U.S. border.[3] And in 2017, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the president of the Inter-American Development Bank confirmed that "the Trump administration is committed to making this initiative a pillar of its broader strategy to combat illegal immigration."[4]

Yet greater collaboration between migration-management and development actors can also create tension. Unlike the Millennium Development Goals that preceded them, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) unveiled in September 2015 as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development included migration targets. SDG 10.7 calls for all countries to facilitate "safe, orderly, regular, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies."[5] The 2030 Agenda also recognizes the important contributions of migrants to inclusive growth and sustainable development.[6]

The 2017 European Consensus on Development builds on SDG 10.7, but also reflects the growing focus among policymakers on stemming irregular migration. The document explicitly notes that "through development policy, the EU and its Member States will address the root causes of irregular migration and will, *inter alia*, contribute to the sustainable integration of migrants in host countries and host communities and help ensure the successful socioeconomic integration of returning migrants in their countries of origin or transit."[7] This is a tall order for development policy, and risks diverting resources from the primary development objectives articulated in the SDGs adopted by all members of the United Nations. It is, however, unlikely that migration goals will slip from the development cooperation agenda any time soon; for example, the management of irregular migration is likely to be a priority in the upcoming negotiation of a successor to the Cotonou Agreement, the 2000–20 treaty in which the European Union and 79 developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific region pledged cooperation on a variety of development priorities.[8]

At a national level, development agencies are also placing greater emphasis on migration, launching new migration-related initiatives and revisiting existing projects to see if there are opportunities to link them more explicitly to migration.[9] But as development actors incorporate migration into their work with partner countries, and as migration actors pay closer attention to development cooperation in theirs, questions remain about how these actors can work together most effectively. One common concern is that bringing migration goals into development cooperation can complicate relationships between partner countries that have been carefully cultivated over years or decades, potentially undermining long-term development goals by introducing a transactional element that seems to trade off migration cooperation for development assistance. Conversely, critics see certain development approaches as undermining the livelihoods of the rural poor and thereby increasing migration pressures in some regions.

This policy brief explores the rationale for closer cooperation between development and migration actors, including the potential benefits and risks of doing so. It also identifies key areas of common interest where coordination and joint efforts between such actors may prove most fruitful.

II. Why Bring Migration into Development Partnerships, or Vice Versa?

Over the past several years, migration has become a top domestic and foreign policy priority for many governments. Concerns about irregular migration to Europe, for example, have spurred European policymakers to step up funding to combat the "root causes" of migration, a catch-all term that spans much of the conventional development agenda, from investments in jobs and training, infrastructure, and services to improving governance and rebuilding after conflict.[10] Many of these efforts rely on the work of development actors, who provide the know-how and much of the funding that underpin such initiatives.[11] Development professionals and policymakers have considerable experience working with the countries to which migration policymakers now give priority (for example, those in the Middle East and North Africa region and in the Northern Triangle of Central America). Development professionals' established working relationships with national and local governments and civil-society organizations, as well as their familiarity with on-the-ground conditions, are essential to any successful partnership. The outcome of the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration illustrates this deep reliance on development actors (see Box 1).

Box 1. Implementing the Joint Valletta Action Plan

The November 2015 summit in Malta brought together European and African heads of state to discuss cooperation on migration. These leaders adopted the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP), which focused on five priority areas:

- addressing the root causes of migration and displacement;
- enhancing cooperation on legal migration;
- improving protection for refugees and asylum seekers;
- tackling human trafficking and smuggling; and
- improving cooperation on return, readmission, and reintegration.

Implementing this action plan hinges on development funds, and the support and knowledge of development actors. At the summit, leaders launched the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which pools 3.2 billion euros in EU and national funds to address the drivers of migration, instability, and displacement in North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel/Lake Chad region. Most of this money comes from development budgets, where the primary focus of projects is on aims such as economic development, job creation, stability, and good governance. National development agencies (including those of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), UN agencies, and international nongovernmental organizations are key implementing partners for these projects.

Sources: European Council, "Valletta Summit on Migration, 11-12/11/2015," updated May 2, 2018, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/; European Commission, "The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa—EU MS and Other Donors Contributions (Pledges and Received Contributions)," updated May 7, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/contributions_0.pdf; European Commission, "EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa" (brief, Brussels, November 24, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa-20171124-3_en.pdf; European Commission, *The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: 2016 Annual Report* (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf_2016_annual_report_final_en.pdf.

A focus on improving conditions in origin or transit countries is now shared by development agencies and many countries' migration departments. This convergence offers clear opportunities to build synergies between these policy fields. Often, bringing migration goals more directly into development work requires coordination among different departments to avoid working at cross purposes. For example, a development ministry might be working to boost job opportunities in a partner country, while the ministry of trade erects barriers to exports from the same country, thereby reducing employment.

The Swiss government was one of the first to advance interagency collaboration as a key principle in its international migration policy. In 2011, it articulated a whole-of-government approach that gave the Federal Office for Migration, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation joint responsibility for coordinating migration policy across all government departments.[12] The approach made cultivating partnerships with countries of origin and transit based on a balanced consideration of the interests of both parties one of the three pillars of migration policy. "Migration from a development perspective" was the logical expression of this and was adopted as one of the five priority areas for Swiss migration policy.[13]

A. What Does Development Bring to Migration Partnerships?

Partnerships with origin and transit countries have long been part of some destination countries' strategies to manage migration. Examples include Spain and Italy's cooperation with southern Mediterranean countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya since the 1990s, and the United States' longstanding cooperation with Mexico. They are usually based on a nonbinding agreement, such as a memorandum of understanding, that sets out the areas for potential cooperation and intended support as well as outcomes (e.g., technical assistance for and deeper cooperation between border-control agencies). Agreements range from those that incorporate concrete pledges, such as temporary labor agreements setting quotas and procedures, to those that articulate policymakers' intentions, such as readmission agreements as a prerequisite for deeper cooperation between a country of origin and country of destination.

Recent migration partnerships are distinguished by their scope and ambitions, which include a growing focus on development interventions. As well as mobilizing more resources and political will to support these partnerships, destination-country migration officials are moving away from offering their partners benefits such as visa liberalization in isolation, and towards a more comprehensive approach that seeks to address border enforcement, returns, and the drivers of migration simultaneously[14]—though some controversially link the distribution of development assistance to progress on migration-management objectives (see Section III.B.). Migration departments are also working more closely with other agencies (such as those responsible for development, humanitarian assistance, and foreign policy) and trying to engage the private sector and civil society.[15] Yet migration partnerships are often decidedly asymmetrical, more focused on achieving the migration goals of donor countries than those of the recipients of assistance.

The domestic political salience of international migration has encouraged many development cooperation agencies to expand their migration-related work. The Netherlands, for example, launched the Emergency Aid Fund in 2014 and the Addressing Root Causes Fund in 2016, and allocated more funds to its development budget to support refugees and the communities that host them and to tackle youth unemployment in Africa.[16] The government of Sweden has also instructed the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency to explore ways to bring migration into its work more systematically.[17] And the U.S. Agency for International Development has aligned its assistance programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with the Alliance for Prosperity.[18] Germany's Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has expanded its support for voluntary returns and reintegration, while launching three special initiatives to address the drivers of displacement and the onward movement of refugees and migrants. These initiatives, created in 2014, focused on supporting refugees and host communities, promoting stability in the Middle East and North Africa region, and improving food security.[19] The German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), which implements programs for BMZ and other German ministries and advises on migration and development, also runs programs that aim to address drivers of migration, such as a youth employment training project in Tunisia.[20] In all of these cases, a subtext to the development agenda is the assumption that successful development cooperation programs will help to reduce migration pressures, thereby easing the challenges of migration management.

B. What Does Migration Bring to Development Cooperation?

"Mainstreaming migration into development policy" has become something of a mantra for development practitioners since about 2010.[21] As funds for official development assistance (ODA) never seeming to be adequate, both donors and the governments of developing countries have turned to migrant and diaspora populations as development resources—sources of badly needed foreign exchange, direct investment, business linkages, social and economic innovations, access to networks of knowledge, and more.[22] Globally, migrants' remittances are about three times as large as ODA; they support the balance of payments of remittance-receiving countries, provide the foreign currency to pay for critical imports, and help these countries qualify for better terms on international credit markets. Returning migrants have in some countries, including, India, China, and South Korea, helped to provide a critical mass of talent and skills to support industrial development. For all of these reasons and more, development officials in both origin and destination countries have come to the understanding that migration needs to be factored into development planning, both as a resource and a potential source of vulnerability.

Development cooperation initiatives have taken steps to understand migration and its benefits, while mitigating its risks. For some, this has entailed supporting data gathering and analysis of migration trends in countries of origin; in particular, the European Union has helped countries of origin create migration profiles that can form the basis of policies to draw out development benefits from country-specific migration patterns. Several donor countries have also funded return-of-talent programs implemented by the UN Development Program or by the International Organization for Migration—although these have often proved to be expensive and somewhat disappointing. Greater emphasis is now placed on national programs to connect with members of the diaspora, without depending on their physical return.

Many high-income countries have programs for the temporary admission of low-skilled workers, and some design these with development impacts in mind. New Zealand's Recognized Seasonal Employer scheme is one of the most prominent, and features of it have been incorporated in other temporary migration arrangements.[23] Access to labor markets abroad multiplies the earnings of low-skilled workers in developing countries, and their remittances accomplish (if not always on a permanent basis) one of the primary goals of development policy: poverty reduction. However, remittance-dependent countries and households are at the mercy of migration and labor-market policies in destination countries. When Saudi Arabia decides to "Saudi-ize" its labor force, or the United States decides to return hundreds of thousand of holders of Temporary Protected Status to their poverty-stricken countries of origin,[24] the perils of relying on remittance income can be felt immediately. One of the tasks of development cooperation, still in progress, is to find ways to convert remittance income and experience gained in work abroad into sustainable sources of livelihood in countries of origin by opening realistic investment and employment opportunities for migrant households.

In practice, there are several reasons why governments are exploring ways to build development into migration partnerships, and vice versa. One factor is the desire to realize economies of scale: as migration becomes a top political priority and receives more funding, it makes sense for policymakers to explore ways to link efforts across government agencies and maximize the impact of their work. Another, related factor is coordination: as governments scale up their migration-related work, coordinating these efforts effectively—whether by creating joint initiatives or encouraging regular interagency consultations—is paramount. A third factor is the need for relevant expertise: as discussed above, efforts to address some of the main drivers of migration hinge on the expertise of development professionals, while some development efforts (e.g., the facilitation of skills development and transfer) hinge on the availability of legal migration opportunities. Improving coordination is, however, far from simple, given that the priorities of development and migration actors often diverge.

III. How Can Development and Migration Actors Reconcile Differing Priorities?

While there are clear merits to closer collaboration between migration and development actors, balancing their priorities remains a challenge and can stymie cooperation. Successful cooperation requires that migration and development actors reconcile their goals and approaches to partnership and clarify ownership of initiatives.

A. Goals

Broadly speaking, development professionals focus on improving conditions in partner countries—and in some cases, on harnessing the potential of migration as a means of furthering development. Meanwhile, migration officials' efforts to address the conditions in partner countries that drive migration are motivated primarily by a desire to deter irregular migration, including displacement and secondary migration. As a result, enforcing borders and enacting returns are top priorities for many migration agencies—aims that can be difficult to reconcile with the priorities both of origin and transit countries and of the development actors that partner with them.

This misalignment of aims can be traced back to the different perspectives migration-management and development actors take on mobility. While recent migration partnerships have vowed both to tackle irregular migration and to expand opportunities for legal migration, in practice, they focus far more heavily on the former. The EU Migration Partnership Framework, for example, includes opening up legal migration opportunities for refugees and migrants as one of its goals, but efforts launched in its name in five partner countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal) have so far centered squarely on border enforcement and returns.[25] This focus threatens to undermine longstanding efforts to promote regional mobility in Africa, including the African Union's goal of establishing free movement by 2063 and the free-movement regime of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), both of which development actors have supported.[26] With much evidence pointing to the development benefits of migration,[27] it can be difficult to reconcile the focus on strengthening borders with development actors' poverty alleviation agenda.

The issue of returns is the major arena in which migration-management and development policymakers clash. Returning migrants without legal grounds to stay in a country is part of effective migration management and high on the policy agenda for migration agencies. Rates of return from many countries are low, and destination-country governments often see partnerships with origin countries as a useful avenue for improving them.[28] Development agencies, on the other hand, are more likely to emphasize the benefits of migration for countries of origin and are aware that large-scale returns to a poor country can deprive the country of critically important resources and networks for development. Returns are a sensitive subject for many partner countries, and pushing them to cooperate on such an unpopular issue can introduce tensions into relations at home and abroad, undermining cooperation in other areas such as development. This can prove counterproductive even for migration purposes. For example, Mali blocked efforts by France to return its nationals after domestic political opposition to cooperation on returns gained momentum.[29]

The formidable challenge of addressing these issues, coupled with political pressure in destination countries to quickly and effectively curb irregular migration, often leads to migration partnerships with a heavy enforcement focus.[30] It is important to understand the tradeoffs inherent to policies and programming related to border security and returns. If a partnership becomes too one-sided, a partner country may walk away from the relationship, or enter an agreement with little intention of implementing it. Migration and development actors thus need to be clear about the goals of their cooperation and ensure that their work with migrants' countries of origin remains focused on improving conditions in those countries.

B. Approach

Another practical issue is the different approaches migration and development actors take to forming and managing partnerships with other countries. This includes how the terms of cooperation are set, the subsequent management of the relationship, and the methods used to encourage their cooperation.

By virtue of funding migration and development partnerships, it is easy for donor governments to take the reins when setting the terms for cooperation. This can result in deeply asymmetrical partnerships. Development agencies have sought to mitigate this power asymmetry in their work, including through regular opportunities for dialogue between partner governments to encourage shared ownership of these partnerships. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, for example, set out five guiding principles for effective development aid: ownership by partner countries, alignment of donor support with national development priorities, harmonization of donor efforts to avoid duplication, a focus on development results and how they are measured, and mutual accountability for these results.[31]

Efforts to balance partner countries' goals and pursue shared objectives are less advanced in the migration field. Migration partnerships have a reputation for being focused on destination-country objectives, with origin and transit countries expected to comply with their terms to secure financial assistance.[32] As the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation noted in the strategic framework for its Global Program on Migration and Development, "the high political sensitivity around migration in Switzerland and other countries increases the risk for development aid to face instrumentalization and related calls for 'conditionality mechanisms'."[33] The tendency to use development aid to serve migration aims, and to make such assistance conditional on the compliance of recipient countries, is behind suggestions that EU policymakers apply the European Neighborhood Policy "more for more" principle—which rewards countries that make progress on agreed goals with more assistance and closer partnerships—to migration issues, from antismuggling efforts to border management and returns. But the implication is that countries that do not cooperate may have their development support frozen or even reduced—a "less for less" response called for by some Austrian policymakers, for example—which risks further destabilizing fragile states.[34] Attaching such conditions to development assistance included in migration partnerships often works against core development objectives.

While differences of approach can sometimes prove instructive, as when development agencies provide insight into how to build robust relationships with origin and transit countries based on shared priorities, they often hinder cooperation between development-cooperation agencies and migration-management agencies.[35] In addition to divergent underlying goals and approaches to relationship building, migration and development policymakers often have different expectations about the timeframe in which results are expected. While development interventions are planned over a multi-year basis, migration agreements are usually expected to produce swift reductions in irregular migration or improvement in the return of failed asylum seekers, for example. This disconnect may mean that migration policymakers, in a push to achieve short-term aims, adopt more hardline tactics (such as negative conditionality) that may be anathema to development actors. Successful cooperation thus hinges on agreeing to a coherent strategy and clear expectations that recognize and seek to balance the divergent instincts of these two fields.

IV. Where Can Cooperation Add Value?

With these challenges in mind, it is possible to identify several areas where migration-management and development actors share common priorities and where working together could add value for both parties. This includes interventions in origin or transit countries to (1) address barriers to economic growth; (2) build resilience; (3) promote better reintegration outcomes; and (4) facilitate skilled migration.

A. Addressing Barriers to Economic Growth

Barriers to economic growth and a dearth of economic opportunities in partner countries represent an area of shared interest because such conditions both hinder development and drive emigration. Development actors have extensive experience in this field, collaborating with government, civil-society, and private-sector actors on investments in education and vocational training, the creation of jobs in priority sectors or industries, and support for entrepreneurship. But moving the needle on economic growth requires massive and sustained investments coupled with efforts to address structural issues, such as weak governance, trade barriers, and poor infrastructure. The scale of the challenge is far beyond the capacity of any agency to resolve on its own.

As migration-management actors turn their attention to creating alternative livelihood options for would-be migrants, this presents development actors with opportunities to expand their work in two ways. The first comes in the form of additional funding from donor governments and international financial institutions, often in support of economic development projects in key origin or transit countries (such as those in the Middle East and Northern Africa, and in the Northern Triangle of Central America).[36] The second opportunity comes from the growing engagement of other areas of government (such as trade and foreign policy) and the private sector on development issues, which points to a chance to address barriers to economic growth more systematically. The European Consensus on Development, for example, acknowledged that addressing the root causes of migration will require a multifaceted approach that includes improving investment, trade, and innovation conditions in partner countries.[37]

These shifts in migration and development policy priorities have prompted donors to revisit—and step up—their investments in priority countries, including by:

- ***Improving investment conditions in priority countries.*** Engaging the private sector and encouraging investment in developing countries is crucial to economic growth, but investors are often reluctant to enter risky markets. The growing engagement of donor governments provides new opportunities to support private investment by mitigating some of the risks (through guarantees or insurance, for example) and by improving investment conditions. One European Commission response to the 2015–16 European migration crisis was the launch of the External Investment Plan, which introduced the European Fund for Sustainable Development. With an initial budget of 3.35 billion euros, the fund aims to encourage private-sector investment in African countries and other states neighboring Europe by offering guaranteed funding from international financial institutions (e.g., development banks) to governments and private-sector actors for development projects.[38] It also manages the Neighborhood Investment Facility and Africa Investment Facility, which offer blended finance for public and private projects. Meanwhile, in July 2017, the G20 launched its Compact for Africa, which aims to form investment compacts between African countries, G20 countries, and international financial institutions. These investment compacts—initially, to be formed with Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, and Tunisia—assess systemic barriers to private investment (e.g., regulatory constraints), then design and implement a reform program to address these issues.[39]

- ***Boosting access to concessional financing for middle-income countries.*** Middle-income countries can struggle to access affordable financing for large infrastructure projects or other investments in their economies. This gap was particularly apparent in Jordan and Lebanon, as they struggled to access financing that would allow them to scale up infrastructure and extend services to their rapidly growing Syrian refugee populations.[40] The growing engagement of donor governments and international financial institutions on migration issues provides an opportunity to address this. The new Global Concessional Financing Facility established by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Islamic Development Bank offers concessional financing to middle-income countries (such as Jordan and Lebanon) that host large numbers of refugees. Although limited to refugee-hosting countries, the facility offers much-needed medium-to-long-term support for infrastructure projects and efforts to improve the delivery of public services, which can help address structural barriers to economic growth.[41]

- ***Improving trade conditions in priority countries.*** The increased engagement of destination governments may also make it possible to address trade barriers between destination and origin or transit countries—barriers to economic growth that are beyond the purview of development agencies alone. Development actors have provided support for economic integration, for example by offering technical assistance during the rollout of Regional Economic Communities. BMZ's support for ECOWAS is one example.[42] To bolster such efforts, migration-management actors can lend their expertise on visa liberalization and facilitating the mobility of professionals, for example. And as migration becomes a political priority for destination governments and other agencies engage with these issues, this could provide greater impetus for addressing a wider range of barriers to trade, including those within countries, between neighboring countries, and between developing and developed countries or regional blocs (such as the European Union).

B. Building Resilience in Origin and Transit Countries

Another area where development and migration-management actors could work productively together is in strengthening the resilience of origin and transit countries. Essentially, this is crisis-proofing: helping communities prepare to withstand stresses that can range from natural disasters to manmade crises such as conflict, political instability, and economic turmoil.[43] The aims of resilience-building efforts thus run the gamut from increasing food security to conflict resolution to improving governance—efforts that both serve development goals and may reduce incentives for irregular migration.

Cooperation between development and migration-management actors can add value in several ways. As migration becomes a growing political priority, donor governments are allocating more money to efforts to promote resilience in key origin and transit countries.[44] And while development actors have extensive experience designing and implementing resilience-building projects, migration-management actors bring new perspectives to these efforts. They may, for example, bring to bear new approaches to managing institutions or developing high-quality early warning systems that can help agencies prepare and mobilize resources for emerging crises. Migration agencies and other government offices working on issues that are not often the focus of development projects can also help coordinate investments in resilience with more forward-looking thinking on topics such as the future of work and the implications for regional and global labor markets.

Efforts to improve governance are one example of resilience-building projects that could benefit from increased cooperation between development and migration-management actors. Effective governance is key to maximizing the impact of other interventions, such as economic assistance. What's more, the symptoms of poor governance—such as corruption, inadequate infrastructure, limited public services, and ineffective economic management—can contribute to migrants' decisions to leave in search of opportunities elsewhere. One 2017 study found that governance aid (defined broadly as support for government, civil-society, and nongovernmental organizations) is linked to lower levels of migration, particularly among people with lower levels of education.[45] This suggests an area for possible collaboration between development actors, whose experience supporting better governance initiatives dates back to the 1980s, and migration-management actors, who can bring new perspectives on institution-building and managing institutions. The growing engagement of other government departments, such as foreign affairs and trade, on migration issues also offers new insights into the national and international political factors behind weak governance as well as the necessary reforms.[46]

Development actors can also put their governance expertise to work helping developing countries build capacity to manage their own migration policies, in furtherance of SDG 10.7. This includes efforts to support national actors in developing migration policies, strengthening migration-management institutions, and encouraging international cooperation on migration-related issues. One example is the Khartoum Process, which brings together EU policymakers and government officials from the Horn of Africa to address human trafficking and smuggling, including through better migration management. This includes efforts to develop or strengthen antitrafficking legislation and policies, to improve information-sharing, and to bolster protections for trafficked people. Development agencies have played a key role in funding and implementing these efforts.[47] More general development cooperation to strengthen public administration, internal policy coherence, and policy development can also pay dividends in more effective planning, negotiation, and implementation of migration partnerships. This kind of capacity building is a crucial part of helping origin or transit countries participate in migration partnerships on more equal footing, as well as enabling them to fulfill their obligations under international law.

C. Investing in Reintegration Services

As migration-management actors step up their efforts to return unauthorized migrants, development actors can provide crucial expertise on how to help returnees reintegrate effectively—and in doing so, provide much-needed support for overburdened communities in countries of origin. While returns themselves are generally the responsibility of interior and/or justice ministries, some development agencies have experience running reintegration services for returnees.

In addition to fear of political backlash and of losing important remittances, the challenge of reintegrating returning migrants into already weak labor markets may make countries of origin wary of cooperating on returns. Currently, the reintegration support offered to returning migrants is rudimentary; cash payments and initial job-seeking services, some of the most common forms of support, can only go so far in addressing the challenges returnees face when trying to rejoin a community and labor market they may have left years before. As many destination countries give high priority to returns, development actors may find themselves in a difficult position, walking a line between wanting to contribute valuable reintegration expertise and avoiding jeopardizing longstanding relationships with the returned migrants' origin countries and communities.

Development actors are well placed to offer migration actors their expertise on facilitating successful reintegration and minimizing the disruption of returns to origin countries. This may involve administering reintegration services directly or advising migration agencies on how to link up the initial assistance they provide to longer-term employment and education services. One example of this linking-up of development and migration work in this area is the German Returning to New Opportunities initiative, which expands on existing GIZ/BMZ work with return migrants in Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia to offer similar services to those returning to Afghanistan, Egypt, Ghana, Iraq, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. The initiative provides migrants with information on services that can support their reintegration, is opening migrant counselling centers, and is increasing funding for GIZ-run vocational training and employment projects in these countries.[48]

D. Facilitating Skilled Migration

While efforts to slow irregular migration have been the primary focus following the 2015–16 migration crisis, another area where development and migration-management actors could cooperate to add value is in facilitating skilled migration as a tool for economic growth. As many destination-country governments grapple with ageing populations and reduced tax contributions, with their implications for the workforce and public services, migration and development actors could put forth policies that encourage skilled migration in a way that benefits all parties—the so-called triple win in which migrants, origin countries, and destination countries all benefit from migration.[49] The GIZ has piloted several "triple win" projects that aim to benefit countries of origin, Germany, and the participating migrants. These include, for example, working with the German Federal Employment Agency to recruit and train caregivers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Philippines, Serbia, and Tunisia to work in Germany, which is facing a shortage of such workers.[50]

Migration agencies are the gatekeepers that admit migrants to a country, but development actors have a wealth of experience that could help ensure migrants' skills are transferable and maximize the development benefits of migration. Development actors have a long history of working with origin countries on policies that allow migrants to build skills and put them to use as they move across borders (see Box 2). These policies fall into several categories:[51] (1) those that help migrants develop high-quality and portable skills in countries of origin; (2) those that improve the recognition of migrants' skills and experience in destination countries; (3) those that help returning migrants rejoin the origin-country labor market; and (4) those that encourage diasporas to share their skills and expertise with their countries of origin. But if there are few legal migration opportunities for professionals from developing countries, these efforts to encourage the acquisition and transfer of skills can be difficult to sustain.

Box 2. Global Skill Partnerships

One idea that is gaining traction in discussions of how skilled mobility can further development aims is the creation of Global Skill Partnerships. Described by Michael Clemens of the Center for Global Development, such partnerships are bilateral agreements that equip workers in developing countries for skilled jobs at home or in destination countries. Training costs are much lower in sending countries, and by supporting training institutions that have migrant and nonmigrant tracks, donor countries can help create a pool of workers to fill labor-market gaps in both countries. Such efforts can also help to circumvent problems of accreditation by ensuring that training is compatible with destination-country standards and qualifications. For example, the Australia-Pacific Technical College offers Australian vocational qualifications through a number of training institutions in the Pacific Islands as part of its dual remit to build skills and encourage migration to Australia.

Design questions remain, however. This includes how costs should be divided between governments, employers, and the migrants and nonmigrants who receive training; what incentives should be used to encourage participation; how origin- and destination-country training standards can be reconciled to satisfy training institutions and employers in both countries; and how to address other prerequisites to practicing in a particular field (such as host-country language proficiency and work experience). The limited experience with skills partnerships to date has been somewhat disappointing, in some cases because of linguistic and cultural barriers to labor-market integration and in others because most graduates chose not to migrate—hobbling one leg of triple-win programs. While this model offers clear development benefits, encouraging mobility appears to be more of a challenge.

Sources: Kate Hooper, *The Development Benefits of Skills Partnerships and Skilled Migration* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming); Richard Johanson, Richard Curtain, Peter Moock, and Virginia Simmons, *Independent Review of the Australia-Pacific Technical College* (Canberra: Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014), http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/aptc-independent-review.pdf; Michael Clemens, "Global Skill Partnerships: A Proposal for Technical Training in a Mobile World" (brief, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, October 11, 2017), www.cgdev.org/publication/global-skill-partnerships-proposal-technical-training-in-mobile-world-brief.

The question of how to facilitate skilled migration and promote effective skills transfers is only going to become more relevant as the international migrant population grows and destination countries look to migration to address labor shortages. Some of the most successful projects have brought together a wide array of actors in terms of destination-origin cooperation and working across policy portfolios, as well as incorporating employers, educational institutions, and civil-society actors into discussions. Employers have played a particularly central role in some promising efforts in this field, such as those that offer transferable professional credentials or certifications. One example is the Porsche Training and Recruitment Center Asia in Manila, which trains young Filipinos to work as service or bodywork technicians for Porsche, Volkswagen, or Audi in the Middle East.[52] As demographic and migration trends turn destination-country governments' attention to such issues, policymakers can learn from the work development agencies have done on skills transferability, welcome the involvement of other government and nongovernment actors, and, crucially, link these efforts to legal migration opportunities.

V. Conclusion

Migration crises in Europe, the Americas, and elsewhere have spurred renewed interest among destination-country governments in ways to incorporate migration into development work and vice versa. Migration partnerships are growing in scope and ambition, bringing in more resources and adopting a more comprehensive approach that includes both enforcement measures and efforts to address the root causes of migration through targeted development interventions. Meanwhile, development actors are placing a greater emphasis on migration in their work, both in terms of their thematic programming and their country- or region-specific initiatives.

Coordinating the divergent goals and approaches of migration and development actors remains a challenge, but there are clear benefits to doing so. Greater coordination allows governments to realize economies of scale, maximize the impact of their investments, and bring together experts on these issues. Such coordination might, for example, benefit from development actors' expertise about conditions on the ground and ideas about how to construct equitable partnerships around the principles of ownership and trust, and from migration actors' experience building effective migration-management institutions.

As migration rises to the top of the policy agenda for destination-country governments, development actors will gain new resources and opportunities but also new expectations about the ability of development cooperation to reduce migration pressures. If the efforts of migration and development actors are well coordinated, this infusion of resources and political support could bolster efforts to address barriers to economic growth, build the resilience of origin countries, invest in reintegration services, and facilitate skilled migration.

Yet even if concerted efforts are made to reconcile the mandates, priorities, and objectives of migration and development actors, some tensions are likely to persist. Officials responsible for migration policy need to have realistic expectations of what development interventions can accomplish in the short term and resist the urge to look to development as a "cure" for migration. For their part, development policymakers need to maintain the integrity of development strategies while identifying the goals they share with migration policymakers. This could produce a new kind of triple win—for migration management, development cooperation, and people on the move.

Coordinating the divergent goals and approaches of migration and development actors remains a challenge, but there are clear benefits to doing so.

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Acknowledgments

This publication results from a partnership between the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). It is part of the series "Towards the Global Compact for Migration: A Development Perspective," which aims to enrich the conversation around migration and development in the context of the ongoing discussions on the Global Compact for Migration.

The authors are grateful to GIZ and BMZ for their support for this brief. The brief benefitted from input from MPI and GIZ colleagues, including reviews from Melanie Axiotis and Tina Mahler, the advice of Michelle Mittelstadt, the research assistance of Tessa Coggio, the skillful editing of Lauren Shaw, and the layout expertise of Sara Staedicke.

Cover Design and Layout: Sara Staedicke, MPI

Suggested citation: Hooper, Kate and Kathleen Newland. 2018. *Mind the Gap: Bringing Migration into Development Partnerships and Vice Versa*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit think tank dedicated to the study of the movement of people worldwide. The Institute provides analysis, development, and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at the local, national, and international levels. It aims to meet the rising demand for pragmatic responses to the challenges and opportunities that migration presents in an ever more integrated world.

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