
THE FUTURE OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN EUROPE

MAINSTREAMING APPROACHES FOR INCLUSION



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In many Western European countries, immigrant integration is a stand-alone policy area. And the target group for such policies is narrowly defined: immigrants and the descendants of immigrants. However, governments are gradually realising that while such integration policy is very necessary, particularly for recent arrivals, it is insufficient to realise the full potential and participation of immigrants and citizens with an immigrant background in the long run.

For this reason, governments have increasingly turned to the strategy of ‘mainstreaming’ integration—an effort to reach people with a migration background through social programming and policies that also target the general population—in order to address areas where traditional immigrant integration policy has fallen short.

This has led to an adaptation, and sometimes, a transformation of certain mainstream policies. In some cases the process of change has been organic, in others the result of an explicit strategy of mainstreaming integration priorities.

The intended beneficiaries of integration policy (immigrants and their descendants) are no longer a discrete and easily identifiable population—and in some localities they are not even minorities. The second and third generation face some (but not all) of the challenges of their parents, especially in relation to their educational and employment success, but many of these challenges are not unique to those with an immigrant background. At a time when public budgets are tight, governments are articulating new strategies to ensure that the needs of all vulnerable groups are met more effectively through mainstream policy change.

This report assesses the degree to which four European countries—relative veterans regarding the reception and integration of immigrants—have mainstreamed integration priorities across general policy areas such as education, employment, and social cohesion. Approaches to mainstreaming in Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom reflect each country’s distinct ethnic profile, diversity, and social traditions.

Governments are articulating new strategies to ensure that the needs of all vulnerable groups are met more effectively through mainstream policy change.

In Denmark, mainstreaming integration priorities has been part of a deliberate and coordinated effort at the local and, increasingly, also the central level. Germany’s process of mainstreaming immigrant priorities is also institutionalised, involving systematic horizontal and vertical governance coordination efforts. By contrast, France’s approach can be described as more organic or ‘de facto’ mainstreaming, by virtue of its constitutional commitment not to distinguish ethnic groups in the public sphere. And in the United Kingdom, integration policy in the traditional sense has essentially been absent because of the country’s focus on ethnic minorities, race relations, and social cohesion—an outcome that is the legacy of postcolonial immigration flows in which many of the immigrants were already British citizens or subjects.

All these countries have enacted a number of policies to produce better outcomes for vulnerable groups, and they have defined these groups in varying ways.

A. *Methods of mainstreaming*

Despite considerable national variation, these countries engage in three types of mainstreaming activities:

- **Mainstreaming through discourse** is an articulated government vision or strategy for mainstreaming integration policy, or a broader public narrative that explicitly incorporates integration priorities into other goals, such as social inclusion. This approach sets the stage for a long-term framework and strategy for achieving integration goals, or more general goals—such as social cohesion—that promote integration. Narratives are likely to be more effective if they articulate clear objectives, and are underpinned by political consensus. However, examples from both the national and city level reaffirm that in order to be meaningful, and thus useful, the articulated vision ought to be accompanied by an action plan for implementation.

- **Mainstreaming through governance** involves coordinating a range of government actors on integration goals, either horizontally (by involving other policy departments at the same level) or vertically (by distributing responsibilities across multiple levels of government). Mainstreaming through governance has the advantage of making a larger constituency of actors responsible for integration outcomes. It brings greater potential for innovative and widespread change, but also risks fragmentation and chaos by involving multiple actors. Examples from the case study countries indicate that mainstreaming through governance is only as successful as its coordination and accountability mechanisms. Concrete examples of such mechanisms include national -level action plans, commissioners, task forces, conferences, and ministerial groups. With each of these approaches, there is a fine line between overly formal coordination mechanisms, which bring inflexibility and may stifle creativity, and informal coordination mechanisms, which risk poor communication between the relevant constituencies.
- **Mainstreaming through policy** refers to reforms or adaptations of general policies that incorporate integration priorities. This policy adaptation is designed to better serve the diverse populations that benefit from social policies by responding to their specific needs. Mainstreaming through policy can be indirect or direct. *Indirect* approaches focus on addressing problems that may be shared by different types of vulnerable groups—immigrants and others. These initiatives tend to target needs related to income, employment, education, neighbourhood, gender, or ethnic/racial background—rather than offering a policy intervention based on a person’s place of birth or immigrant status. As an example, one of the main strategies in France and the United Kingdom has been to target deprived areas based on criteria such as level of unemployment or social housing. By contrast, *direct* approaches include targets for immigrant groups specifically within mainstream policies. Promising practices in this approach include preschool testing for children to identify language needs, or diversity training for mainstream service providers, such as teachers and job-centre personnel.

This report demonstrates that mainstreaming immigrant integration policy presents a high-potential opportunity for policymakers to address increasingly diverse needs. Mainstreaming implies a more sustainable approach to integration by embedding priorities within a range of policies, and allows policymakers to respond to concrete needs rather than birth characteristics. Through mainstreaming, the final goal is to create public services that are attuned to the needs of the whole population, regardless of background.

However, mainstreamed approaches also carry the risk that by dispersing responsibility to a multitude of actors, policies may become fragmented, poorly coordinated, and unevenly implemented. Given these potential gains and pitfalls of mainstreaming immigrant integration policy, the final section of the report turns to defining principles of good mainstreaming practice.

B. Principles of good practice

The design of mainstreaming strategies and initiatives depends a great deal on a government’s specific goals, as well as its political, social, and economic context. Nonetheless, the research identified a number of common success factors.

- **Tailor to context.** Mainstreaming initiatives need to be shaped to fit existing governance structures, empirical realities, and political constraints.
- **Establish clear goals.** When asked, policymakers should be able to answer the question of *why* they want to mainstream immigrant integration policy, and the benefits they foresee. This means that the decision *not* to mainstream should always remain a possibility.
- **Build political will.** Areas with cross-party consensus or buy-in from multiple agencies (including nongovernmental organisations) are likely to be more successful. Each policymaker needs to be open to the adaptation of his or her policy agenda.
- **Invest wisely.** Numerous examples of large-scale financing, micro-financing, and self-sustaining projects highlight that budgets do not need to be extensive to achieve goals, but rather should be tailored to fit objectives.
- **Collaborate strategically.** Shared responsibility is at the heart of the mainstreaming process but requires exceptional cooperation. This may require institutionalised frameworks for collaboration, and closer partnerships with nongovernmental actors.
- **Ensure responsibility and accountability.** Clear mandates are required to ensure coherent shared responsibility, as well as an accountability mechanism or authority to make sure that no tasks are overlooked.

- **Make use of data.** The lack of existing data on interventions and outcomes is a key weakness in all countries. It will be difficult to both design effective interventions and assess their effects on sections of the population without a solid evidence base.

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, it has become clear that national immigrant integration policies across Europe have been a necessary yet insufficient response to the needs of a rapidly diversifying population. Episodes of social unrest in several countries, segregated neighbourhoods, and divergent employment outcomes between natives and immigrants are all signs that European countries need more policy instruments to ensure the success of communities overall.

Immigrant integration is a comparatively young policy area in Europe, initially developing across the Northwest in response to the needs of newly arrived immigrant populations over the last few decades. Over time, these policies have evolved, become broader in scope, and become more sophisticated, as priorities have shifted and policymakers have identified new needs. In most countries, the integration portfolio has remained a stand-alone policy area with a narrowly defined target group, identified exclusively by immigration status and heritage. But as integration challenges mount, governments are beginning to look for alternative methods of addressing longer-term inequality and segregation within communities.¹

This report examines whether and how four European countries—Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—have designed and adapted their policy approaches with a view to mainstreaming immigrant integration policy. ‘Mainstreaming’ is the effort to reach people with a migration background through social programming and policies that also target the general population, rather than through specific immigrant integration policies alone. In the future, mainstream policy areas—such as education, employment, youth, housing, and social cohesion—will be the core means to address socioeconomic needs within the population, instead of specific immigrant integration policies that target individuals and groups based on national origin. Rather, integration will be embedded in a wide range of policy initiatives.

‘Mainstreaming’ is the effort to reach people with a migration background through social programming and policies that also target the general population

Despite a common impetus to mainstream, the concept has emerged in a wide variety of ways, and is being implemented within highly divergent institutional and political contexts. The report considers how governments in Europe are adapting existing public services to cope with a more diverse clientele, assesses the extent to which mainstreamed integration policies are capable of reaching immigrant groups without directly targeting them, and identifies good practices across a variety of national and cultural contexts. It pays particular attention to the potential payoffs and risks of the various methods described, ultimately formulating concrete recommendations for policymakers.

This report is the first in-depth analysis of the ‘state of the art’ of existing practices of mainstreaming integration policy across multiple national contexts; and is the result of ten months of research based on an extensive literature review, detailed country case studies, in-depth interviews, and tailored study visits in the four countries. After introductory sections that offer notes on the research approach and policy context, the report outlines three types of strategies in detail—mainstreaming through discourses, governance, and policy—and pulls examples from the four case-study countries to illustrate the strengths and pitfalls of a wide variety of approaches. Next, the report assesses mainstreaming in youth policy in particular, honing in on one of the most pressing needs in many European countries: bettering outcomes for the children of immigrants, and in the process, improving social cohesion and building a competitive workforce for the future. Finally, the report synthesises these findings into a set of policy considerations for mainstreaming immigrant integration effectively.

1 It is in this context that the Dutch Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs requested this research. This report and its accompanying country studies (forthcoming in 2014) were sponsored by the Dutch government and offer ground-breaking research into ways of using mainstream policy to address some of the challenges that have not been resolved through targeted integration policies alone.

A. Why now?

The broad idea of mainstreaming originates from the desire to ensure the equal treatment of certain groups across the whole of government, and mainstreaming policies are particularly common in the areas of gender and disability in education. The practice of explicitly mainstreaming immigrant integration priorities has existed for a number of decades—particularly at the local level where integration actually takes place—but with loosely defined form.

At the European Union (EU) level, mainstreaming immigrant integration policy was an objective within the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in 2004, and was highlighted in the Common Agenda for Integration in 2005.² The European Commission further elaborated the concept within the second edition of the *Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners*, which outlined three principles underlying mainstreamed policies.³ First, that the perspective of immigrant groups should be incorporated into all policies at all levels of governance. Second, that organisations tasked with addressing the needs of the general society or community should ensure equal access to their services by an increasingly diverse population. Finally, that government agencies must balance mainstreamed approaches (adapted to address immigrant needs) with targeted measures, particularly when more specific immigrant needs are evident.

The second and third generation of immigrants do not need to ‘adapt’ or ‘integrate’ in a traditional sense, but may face structural barriers to succeeding.

But despite this high-level policy focus, research into the concept and practice of mainstreaming immigrant integration policy is scarce. It has been used in policy circles with wide-ranging meanings but, overall, there is poor understanding and evaluation of existing practice, and little writing on the topic, whether academic or policy-focused. This is due, in part, to the fact that the idea of mainstreaming integration policy has emerged only recently, but also to the complex nature of the policy area itself.

Several recent developments, however, have made urgent the need for a deeper understanding of mainstreaming practices through more sustained research and analysis:

More heterogeneous immigrant populations and increasingly diverse societies. Over the past few years, governments have faced increased pressure to adopt a more mainstreamed approach to immigrant integration for several reasons. First, there is a demographic imperative—immigrant populations have become more heterogeneous (incorporating a greater number of nationalities), and societies themselves have also become more diverse overall. The proportion of the population with an immigration background is rising across Europe, particularly in larger cities. The percentage of the foreign-born population varies from 10 to 45 per cent in urban areas in the four case-study countries that underpin this report (see Table 1).

Rising numbers of second- and third-generation immigrants. European states have growing numbers of the nativeborn with parents of an immigrant background. The wide variety of needs of these second and third generations differs from that of the first generation. In fact, these needs may decrease, as a growing number (20 per cent) of the second-generation immigrant youth is enrolled in higher education.⁴ However, the present study highlights that immigrant youth still face barriers to entry into the labour market, or in obtaining vocational training and apprenticeships. Second-generation immigrant youth of lower socioeconomic background, with lower-skilled parents, are in a particularly vulnerable position in society, and not all current educational or employment policies are equipped to address their needs.⁵

Thus, European immigrant populations are not only diverse in their origins, but also in terms of their cohorts. The second and third generation of immigrants do not need to ‘adapt’ or ‘integrate’ in a traditional sense, but may face structural barriers to succeeding in education or on the labour market. Whilst some communities have high levels of diversity, others remain homogenous (including communities with or without immigrant background). Therefore, mainstreaming the priorities for the comprehensive inclusion and participation of people with an immigrant background into general policies is becoming the most constructive approach to manage a diverse society.

² European Commission, ‘European Website on Integration: EU Actions to make Integration Work’, accessed 27 February 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/EU_actions_integration.cfm.

³ European Commission, *Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners*, 2nd edition (Brussels: Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom, and Security, 2007), [http://www.iriv-migrations.net/fichiers/Communication/handbook_integration%202007%20\(1\).pdf](http://www.iriv-migrations.net/fichiers/Communication/handbook_integration%202007%20(1).pdf).

⁴ Maurice Crul, Jens Schneider, and Frans Lelie, *Super-diversity: A new perspective on integration* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2013).

⁵ Ibid.

Table 1. Foreign-born population of regions and cities in France, Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 2011-12

Country	Region	City	Total population	Total foreign-born population	Foreign born (%)
Denmark*			5,599,665	454,296	8.1
		Copenhagen	557,920	93,853	16.8
		Aarhus	318,757	35,263	11.1
France**			64,612,940	5,514,154	8.5
		Paris	2,243,833	455,633	20.3
		Marseille	850,726	109,870	12.9
		Lille	227,560	24,234	10.7
		Roubaix	94,713	17,927	18.9
		Lyon	484,344	58,357	12.1
Germany**			81,843,743	7,409,754	9.1
	Berlin***	Berlin	3,501,872	494,391	14.1
	North Rhine-Westphalia		17,841,956	1,908,121	10.7
		Düsseldorf	592,393	108,453	18.3
		Cologne	1,017,155	166,116	16.3
	Bavaria		12,595,891	1,246,317	9.9
		Munich	327,962	42,765	13
	Baden-Württemberg		10,786,227	1,306,879	12.1
		Stuttgart	613,392	138,832	22.6
United Kingdom****			62,498,612	7,509,000	12
	England		51,806,000	6,908,000	13.3
		Bradford	511,000	78,000	15.3
		Hackney	221,000	84,000	38
		Tower Hamlets	240,000	107,000	44.6
	Wales		2,988,000	155,000	5.2
	Northern Ireland		1,789,000	106,000	5.9
	Scotland		5,160,000	340,000	6.6
		Glasgow	598,830	65,000	10.9

* Denmark figures are from the 4th quarter of 2012.

** Germany and France only measure foreign nationality so these numbers refer to citizens with a foreign nationality. In France these are predominantly first-generation immigrants (newly arrived in the first five years), while in Germany these can be second-generation immigrants due to a restrictive citizenship law until recently. France figures are from 2010; Germany figures from 2011.

*** The State and City of Berlin are the same political and administrative entity.

**** All United Kingdom figures are from 2011.

Source: UK National Statistics, 'Cross-cutting topic: Migration', Local Area Migration Reports, www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/cross-cutting-topics/migration/index.html; General Register Office for Scotland, 'Population by Country of Birth and Nationality', www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/statistics/theme/population/estimates/special-populations/country-nationality.html; Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, 'Étrangers – Immigrés', www.insee.fr/fr/themes/theme.asp?theme=2&sous_theme=5; Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 'Area and population', www.statistik-portal.de/Statistik-Portal/en/en_inhalt01.asp; Statistics Denmark, 'Immigrants and their Descendants', accessed 27 February 2014, [www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/indvandrerere-og-efterkommere.aspx](http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/indvandrerere-og-efterkommere/indvandrerere-og-efterkommere.aspx).

Increasing frustration in policy circles and among the public. Policymakers are reconsidering the approach of targeted integration policies due to political and economic drivers. Policymakers and populations have a growing sense that integration models have 'failed' across Northern Europe. This runs deeper than the political pronouncements that 'multiculturalism has failed';⁶ and refers instead to the glacial progress in narrowing educational and employment gaps between native and immigrant populations, a sense of local segregation within communities, and increasing concern that some populations are becoming ever more segregated from mainstream society.

6 *The Telegraph*, 'Nicolas Sarkozy declares multiculturalism had failed', 11 February 2011, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-multiculturalism-had-failed.html.

Need for fiscal austerity and flexibility. At the same time, governments no longer have the financial flexibility to invest in a broad range of specifically designed integration measures to tackle these challenges. The economic downturn of the past five years has taken its toll on integration budgets; policymakers across the board are being asked to design policies that are both cost-effective and capable of improving outcomes for society as a whole. They are under pressure to avoid the appearance of prioritising the needs of immigrants over other groups that might also be at a disadvantage.

B. Parameters and caveats

It is important to clarify what this study means by ‘integration policy’, ‘immigrant’, and ‘mainstreaming’. First, in each country there are core integration policies that target newcomers, and cater to their very specific language and orientation needs. This category of policy measures is *not* under review within this study, as it is understood that targeted ‘reception’ policies such as these—frequently limited in time and scope—lay the foundations for further long-term integration. It is this longer-term integration, and the broader policies designed to foster equality of outcome and community cohesion, that this study investigates.

Second, the term ‘immigrant’ has developed a different meaning across various countries. In France, immigrants are identified as new arrivals *stricto sensu*. However, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands identify an individual’s immigrant heritage (whether one or both parents, or even a grandparent is an immigrant). In the United Kingdom, discourse—and thus policy—focuses on ethnic minority status and ensuring the equality of British citizens, rather than focusing on migrant status or background. To be as comprehensive and meaningfully comparative as possible, this study explores the question of why and how governments are mainstreaming priorities relating to the longer-term inclusion and integration of people with an immigrant background (first, second, and later generations) into general policies. For the purposes of this report, references to immigrant groups refer to the first, second, and third generation, unless otherwise specified.

The term ‘immigrant’ has developed a different meaning across various countries.

It is clear from the paucity of existing research and policy analysis on mainstreaming integration that this report is one of the first comparative assessments of this kind. As such, much of the report considers the particular nature of the phenomenon, and explains how best to understand *types* of mainstreaming activity, and how they work in practice. In addition, the relative novelty of the concept means that many practices are recent, and governments have undertaken few solid evaluation and assessment strategies. As a result, this final report avoids identifying practices as ‘best’, but rather focuses on particular aspects of these initiatives that can help policymakers construct practices relevant for their own policy context. The various approaches outlined in this report should not be seen as templates, but as pathways to increasing the effectiveness of mainstream policy for those with an immigrant background, and improving the collaboration and coordination between the many governmental and nongovernmental agents responsible for such policy.

C. A note on data

Approximately one-tenth of the population in the countries studied in this report is foreign born, but it remains difficult to draw a comparable, comprehensive picture of the total population with immigrant background in these countries (including the foreign born as well as those with one or two parents of immigrant background).

The immigrant youth population is particularly hard to grasp. Throughout the project, both researchers and practitioners have confirmed that the number of children with an immigrant background is reaching up to half of the overall primary school pupil population in certain densely populated urban areas, such as in the regions of North Rhine-Westphalia and Hessen in Germany; and in the London boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest.⁷ However, very little infor-

⁷ Study visits and meetings with practitioners in Germany and the United Kingdom. The authors of this report, as well as the authors of the forthcoming country-specific mainstreaming reports, held study visits to all four case-study countries between May and July 2013. The visits included meetings with government officials, leaders of community organisations, and others involved with immigrant integration, and are referenced throughout the report. Individual names and titles are not listed in order to ensure that officials could speak freely about their work and observations.

Box I. The relevance of mainstreaming at the local level

Integration occurs on the local level, as migrants establish themselves in neighbourhoods, schools, and other community structures; because of this, local governments have long been involved with immigrant integration. And large cities are increasingly adopting policy approaches that reflect local integration philosophies, sometimes in opposition to national trends: Amsterdam and London have persistently defined themselves as cosmopolitan and multicultural cities even as national policies move in the opposite direction.

Scholars of integration have suggested that local authorities are in a better position to accommodate ethnic difference and develop group-specific measures than national governments. Local political structures may be more open to migrant groups than national, as they are relatively insulated from broader (national) public and political debates, and they benefit from stronger links with migrant organisations.

However, the development of mainstreamed local migrant integration policies does not necessarily lead to effective and mainstreamed multilevel governance. In many cases, local-level policies have followed a different logic and even, at times, directly conflicted with national policies.

There is also evidence of instances where effective multilevel governance was more successful, especially when policy-makers created specific venues to foster coordination of multilevel policy. Therefore, successful integration efforts must involve officials from all levels of government, foster exchange among them, and ensure that resources are distributed effectively.

Source: Tiziana Caponio and Maren Borkert, *The local dimension of migration policymaking* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010); Michael Alexander, *Cities and Labour Immigration: Comparing Policy Responses in Amsterdam, Paris, Rome and Tel Aviv* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007); Rinus Penninx, Karen Kraal, Marco Martiniello, and Steven Vertovec, *Citizenship in European cities: immigrants, local politics and integration policies* (Hants, UK: Ashgate, 2004); Virginie Guiraudon, 'Policy Change Behind Gilded Doors: Explaining the Evolution of Aliens' Rights in France, Germany and the Netherlands, 1974-94' (PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1997); Frank De Zwart, 'The dilemma of recognition: Administrative categories and cultural diversity', *Theory and Society* 34, no. 2 (2005): 137-69; Martin Bak Jørgensen, 'The Diverging Logics of Integration Policy Making at National and City Level', *International Migration Review* 46, no. 1 (2012): 244-78; Caelesta Poppelaars and Peter Scholten, 'Two Worlds Apart: The Divergence of National and Local Immigrant Policies in the Netherlands', *Administration & Society* 40, no. 4 (2008): 335-57; Peter Scholten, 'Agenda dynamics and the multi-level governance of intractable policy controversies: The case of Dutch migrant integration policies', *Policy Sciences* 46, no. 3 (2013): 217-36.

mation exists on the size of the first-, second-, and third-generation immigrant youth population, particularly in the early school stages. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) does not collect data on those below the age of 15, including in its Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) database.⁸ Eurostat offers information on native and foreign-born school populations for all ages, but contains no information on parental background. OECD research from 2012 states that the stock of foreign-born immigrants in most OECD countries is higher than the numbers of their native-born offspring, but it does not paint a full picture of the total size of the population with a migrant background.⁹

OECD's PISA database contains data on the first and second languages that students speak, but this does not directly cohere with the size of the immigrant youth population, and it also presents a skewed image of languages spoken in densely populated urban areas because it shows national, rather than local results. For instance, PISA 2009 shows that fewer than 5 per cent of 15-year-olds in Denmark speak a language other than Danish at home,¹⁰ while officials in the city of Aarhus have confirmed that in that locality—one of the two cities in Denmark with the largest and most diverse population—around 20 per cent of pupils in school understand Danish as a second language.

The lack of comprehensive data in this field makes it harder for both researchers and policymakers to ascertain the scale of the challenge in question, identify the neighbourhoods that need the most attention, and determine how best to respond. The collection of more accurate data is essential for helping decisionmakers strike the right balance between targeted and mainstream policies regarding public service provision, and particularly education and youth policy.

8 For more information about the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), including the participation criteria, see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 'FAQ: OECD PISA', www.oecd.org/pisa/faquecdpisa.htm.

9 OECD, *Settling In: OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/settling-in-oecd-indicators-of-immigrant-integration-2012_9789264171534-en.

10 OECD, 'Database – PISA 2009', accessed 27 February 2014, <http://pisa2009.acer.edu.au/interactive.php>.

II. VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL CONTEXT: BASIC APPROACHES TO IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICIES AND PRIORITIES

Over the past few decades, Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have designed and managed integration policies in a variety of ways. These governments also differ in how they use language and terminology to frame integration goals—which ultimately affects policies. The variance depends a great deal on each country's historical and political background, as well as the composition of the immigrant populations. The way that a country shapes migration and integration policies frequently depends upon the type of arrival (e.g., economic, humanitarian, family) and the socioeconomic and educational background of each migrant group. It is important to note that there is enormous diversity in culture, education and social capital within each immigrant population, and correspondingly, their needs vary enormously. This can also change over time. Today, a new wave of migrants from Central Europe and further east has further diversified existing migrant stocks, and added a new layer of complexity.

A. *The policy context in each case-study country*

Denmark has experienced immigration flows comparatively recently, and immigrants from non-Western European countries have dominated this flow, diversifying Denmark's fairly homogenous society in just a few decades. Other than the relatively small-scale regional Northwest European (especially Scandinavian) migration flows, arrivals in Denmark have been primarily asylum seekers, refugees, and dependants from Asia and Africa—particularly from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia.¹¹ However, Denmark has been quick to adapt to a newly diverse society. The first Danish *Integration Act* entered into force in 1999, followed by the establishment of a Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration (INM) in 2001, which coordinated relevant policy. However, the 2011 change in government has entailed a shift from a centralised to decentralised approach to integration: the INM was abolished in 2011, and its competences divided between the Ministry of Justice (responsible for migration, asylum and naturalisation), the Ministry of Social Affairs, Children and Integration (overall integration and social cohesion policy) and the Ministries of Employment and of Education.

At the national level, this change resulted from a political conviction that the designated Ministries of Employment and Education are best placed to handle thematically specific integration policy. At the local level, particularly in the larger cities of Copenhagen and Aarhus, there has been a more deliberate effort to mainstream in order to actively promote diversity.¹² Municipalities have much discretion to design and implement their own policies and initiatives concerning the immigrant population. But such mainstreaming does not occur to an absolute degree in Denmark: the core goal (and challenge) is to strike a balance between adapting mainstream policies while addressing the specific needs of the immigrant population.

France has experienced steady immigration inflows since the 19th century, and these flows have increased during the second half of the 20th century. More recently, they have slowly decreased. As a result of a long but recently-diminishing period of immigrant inflows, France today has one of the highest proportions of immigrant descendants in Europe—a large proportion of whom are Muslims of Maghreb and sub-Saharan African origin.¹³ However, there is no ethnically-based statistical data on these trends, as French politics and policy approaches strongly subscribe to the principle of egalitarian treatment, and the government does not record the ethnicities or national origins of citizens. Both through policy discourse and design, this means that immigrant integration policy in France is officially limited to reception policy or support for the first five years upon arrival. Once immigrants become French citizens or reside permanently in France, they are no longer considered to be targets for immigrant integration.

11 Statistics Denmark, 'Population at the first day of the quarter by municipality, sex, age, marital status, ancestry, country of origin and citizenship' (2012 Q4), www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=FOLK1&PLanguage=1&PXSID=0&wsid=cftree.

12 See the Denmark country report in this series for more information on the local approach. Martin Bak Jørgensen, *Decentralising immigrant integration: Denmark's mainstreaming initiatives in employment, education, and social affairs* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014 forthcoming).

13 OECD, *Settling In: OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration*, 34.

Until 2010, immigration and integration policy were strongly connected within the former Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Codevelopment. Today, integration policy (primarily reception of newcomers) remains under the umbrella of the Ministry of the Interior—within the Office for Reception, Integration and Citizenship (*Direction générale des étrangers en France* (General department for foreigners; DAEN), together with all other migration-related policies. Beyond this, the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (*l'Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances*; Acsé) is responsible for the social cohesion and inclusion of all French citizens, including those of immigrant descent.¹⁴ Immigrant integration is not Acsé's official responsibility, but it reaches out to this population because the agency's work targets socioeconomically disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Integration policy at the Ministry of Interior is being evaluated to assess the extent to which certain competences should remain under its auspices, suggesting a potential transfer (or sharing) of competence elsewhere within government.

Immigrant integration policy in France is officially limited to reception policy or support for the first five years upon arrival.

Germany experienced mass labour migration during the second half of the 20th century, coming mostly from Southern Europe, the former Yugoslavia, and Turkey. However, official recognition of Germany's status as a country of immigration came just 15 years ago, and the government developed a comprehensive integration policy in 2005. The new immigration law created the federal and regional obligation to provide integration courses, monitored and evaluated by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. In 2006, representatives of federal and local government and community organisations convened for the first 'integration summit', and agreed to develop a National Integration Plan.¹⁵ This agreement and the plans that emerged from it remain the general framework for governmental cooperation on integration policy in Germany. Integration policy in Germany consists of reception policies for newly arrived immigrants, as well as inclusive measures for second- and third-generation immigrants.

On the basis of the *National Action Plan on Integration*, published in 2011,¹⁶ institutionalised cooperation regarding immigrant integration has increased both horizontally (between different ministries and departments) and vertically (between different governmental levels, from federal and regional to local) in the form of various conferences, committees, and networks.¹⁷ Officially, responsibility for immigration and integration policy forms part of the mandate of the Federal Office and the Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration. The Commissioner sits in the Chancellor's Office, reflecting a political, cross-government commitment to integration policy, while the Federal Office for Migration, Refugees, and Integration coordinates policy and operates under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Interior. However, at the same time, much of the real responsibility is devolved to the Commissioners for Migration, Refugees, and Integration at the state (*Länder*) level, and municipalities have considerable discretion to design and implement their own integration policies.

The United Kingdom has a comparatively long history of labour and family inflows from former colonies and the Commonwealth. These migrants and their descendants have become part of mainstream British life over the past half-century. Britain's largest ethnic minorities are Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African, and Caribbean. Many of the migrants from the former empire and the Commonwealth already held British citizenship and were British subjects or protected persons; thus, 'ethnic minority' rather than 'immigrant' became a more appropriate label for these groups. Even today, ethnicity and migration status are largely unrelated concepts in the United Kingdom.

14 For more information, see the French country report in this series. Angeline Escafré-Dublet, *Mainstreaming immigrant integration policy in France: Education, employment, and social cohesion initiatives* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014 forthcoming).

15 Maria Böhmer, 'The National Integration Plan – A Contribution of Germany Towards Shaping a European Integration Policy' (Statement of the Commissioner of the Federal Government for Migration, Refugees and Integration, Berlin), www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Resources/Forum21/Issue_No10/N10_National_integration_plan_en.pdf.

16 Federal Government of Germany, *National Action Plan on Integration: Abridged Press Version* (Berlin: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 2011), www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/IB/2012-01-31-nap-kurzfassung-presse-englisch.pdf?blob=publicationFile&v=1. See also the full document in German, Die Bundesregierung, *Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration: Zusammenhalt stärken – Teilhabe verwirklichen* (Berlin: Presseund Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2011), www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/IB/2012-01-31-nap-gesamt-barrierefrei.pdf?blob=publicationFile&v=5.

17 See the Germany country report in this series for more information. Petra Bendel, *Coordinating immigrant integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the federal and local levels* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014 forthcoming).

Britain has a strong nondiscrimination legislative framework and model of race relations, both of which focus on safeguarding the equal treatment of the country's various ethnic groups, regardless of immigrant status. As a result, ethnicity, diversity, and inclusion policies are considered separately from the government's immigration policy.¹⁸

The Home Office is responsible for immigration as well as asylum and refugee policy (including the reception and integration of refugees). There is no immigrant integration policy in the United Kingdom that is comparable to countries like Germany or Denmark. Instead, Britain applies both social inclusion and community cohesion models, which incorporate all citizens and target the socioeconomically disadvantaged regardless of ethnicity or origin, and ensure that diverse local communities function harmoniously. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) has the primary responsibility for achieving these goals, and coordinates with different departments at the central, regional, and local levels. However, in practice, local authorities and organisations assume (and are expected to assume) primary responsibility for the creation and implementation of concrete social cohesion policies, with financial support from the central and regional government. This has led to a fragmented approach. As a result, the United Kingdom has no targeted policy approaches to reach people with immigrant backgrounds, but policymakers work within mainstream policies to address specific disadvantages such as low educational outcomes, barriers to labour market entry, and youth delinquency.

B. Framing and priorities

How policymakers frame and label people of immigrant descent in their countries greatly defines how they are able to address integration through policy. Each country also works to its own set of policy priorities and objectives. Defining these clearly is central to ensuring that policies mainstreamed throughout government have consistent approaches and work toward the same goal.

In countries such as Germany and Denmark, the broader category of immigrant groups—referring to both the foreign born and the children and grandchildren of immigrants—means that integration policy interventions have a wider remit. Through integration policy, Denmark and Germany can address the needs of the second and third generation, as is evident in their approaches to language testing: in both countries, language needs are assessed according to second language learning, rather than immigrant status, so those children who are born in country but have not yet learned the language can receive remedial help. The benefits of this broader approach are clear, but it also carries the risk that immigrant groups will be stigmatised for several generations. In France, an immigrant is, by definition, limited to the first generation, and integration policy in France is therefore strictly applicable to the first five years after arrival. This reflects the desire not to stigmatise those from an immigrant background, and stick to the constitutional framework of equal treatment of citizens. Consequentially, France does not target or collect data on second- or third-generation immigrants, who thus fall within the remit of social cohesion policy. This can have a negative effect on policymakers' ability to identify the needs of second and third generations, and affect their outcomes. Indeed, Acsé practitioners have acknowledged the difficulty of operating within such a limited mandate: they cannot monitor and assess the success of policies because they are not allowed to identify the particular background of residents.¹⁹

How policymakers frame and label people of immigrant descent in their countries greatly defines how they are able to address integration through policy.

The United Kingdom sits somewhere in between. There is no actual integration policy in the United Kingdom, apart from a well-framed integration policy for newly arrived refugees. The United Kingdom has never targeted population groups based on their country of origin or immigrant background, but the government keeps records of ethnic background, primarily to monitor for racial discrimination. Within this framework, ethnic minorities may sometimes be targeted through programmes relating to social cohesion, education, or employment—but not immigrant integration per se.

With respect to immigrant inclusion, local British authorities are responsible for recognising and responding to the practical, linguistic, or socioeconomic needs of both newly arrived immigrants and people of ethnic-minority origin,

¹⁸ See the United Kingdom country report in this series for more background information. Sundas Ali and Ben Gidley, *Advancing outcomes for all minorities: Experiences of mainstreaming immigrant integration policy in the United Kingdom* (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014 forthcoming).

¹⁹ Authors' meeting with officials of the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (Acsé) in Paris, 1 July 2013.

but these targeted initiatives remain part of a broader mainstreamed framework of social inclusion for all citizens. In some ways, this approach appears to be a happy compromise, allowing for some targets to be set, but avoiding any stigmatisation. However, with a new wave of immigrants from Central Europe who share ethnicity with the majority population, it is becoming harder to use an exclusively ethnic-minority approach.²⁰

Each of these countries has prioritised integration objectives differently. In Denmark, Germany, and to a lesser extent France, the core goals are improving educational and labour market outcomes. Of the countries within this study, German policymakers have been the most emphatic about the need to improve prospects for immigrant youth. In recent years, two empirical challenges have emerged: first, that immigrant children are faring particularly poorly in the German education system (evidenced by the 2009 PISA results);²¹ and second, that Germany's demographic future is bleak enough that to 'lose' a generation of potential workers is economically untenable. These imperatives are echoed across Europe, though demographic decline has yet to become a significant feature of the integration debate.

In France, the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent Denmark, scenes of urban civil unrest in recent years have guided a second goal: ensuring that communities are cohesive, and that young people are not excluded from mainstream society. These two goals are closely linked, but emphasis on one or the other can affect the design of mainstreamed interventions, and determine which actors are given core responsibility to address these challenges. With respect to the goal of creating cohesive communities, local authorities are more likely to be closely involved.

Of the countries within this study, German policymakers have been the most emphatic about the need to improve prospects for immigrant youth.

This leaves a number of questions for policymakers wishing to introduce a more mainstreamed approach to immigrant integration. First, to what extent can mainstream policy both identify and target immigrant populations? This is not just a question of capacity, but also of political will, as there may be little desire to focus policy interventions on those with an immigrant background specifically. If immigrants are not *directly* targeted through mainstream policies, policymakers can consider *indirect* routes to meeting their needs and improving integration outcomes.

Secondly, what specific goals do policymakers wish to address? While many of the major goals overlap—reducing unemployment levels in a locality is likely to have a positive effect on community cohesion—the prioritisation of goals will affect the design and focus of the intervention, as well as the means to assessing success.

III. MAINSTREAMING INTEGRATION POLICY— WHY AND HOW?

The rationale behind mainstreaming immigrant integration policy is that adapting mainstream services to address the needs of the entire diverse population—including, but not limited to, immigrants—has the potential to build a more inclusive and successful society, in which each member has an equal opportunity to fulfil his or her potential. Mainstreaming has emerged as a powerful concept in the policy discourse on migrant integration. Mainstreaming immigrant integration means that integration is embedded in a broad range of policy initiatives that target natives as well as migrants, as opposed to remaining a stand-alone policy field. It thus follows the same logic as the mainstreaming of gender issues. Throughout Europe, a number of countries and cities have been reformulating their immigrant integration policies in order to share the cross-policy challenges of immigrant integration by different governmental departments.

In order to better understand the various mainstreaming approaches undertaken in the countries of study, this section outlines the different ways that governments can undertake mainstreaming, and offers policy examples from the four countries to highlight the pros and cons of each.

20 Currently, white immigrants are categorised as 'White (other)' in national statistics, but their descendants are then subsumed into the 'White British' category; while descendants of immigrants from Asia or the Caribbean retain their ethnic minority status.

21 OECD, 'PISA 2009 Key Findings', accessed 27 February 2014, www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/pisa2009keyfindings.htm.

Three core elements of mainstreaming have emerged during the course of this project: the political *discourse* concerning the need for a cross-cutting approach, the *coordination* between government departments to apply that approach, and the policy *measures* used to implement mainstreaming in practice. This report posits that to be successful, a mainstreaming strategy needs to incorporate all three aspects. Through the research, it is clear that each element of mainstreaming entails a number of policy choices that can facilitate or inhibit successful outcomes. However, the particular national and local policy context is key to determining what choices can, or should, be made.

Finally, it is clear that, in several cases, mainstreaming has emerged as a de facto or organic element of broader policy choices, rather than a deliberate effort to mainstream (see Table 2). This complicates the issue, as there are a number of useful policy examples that have emerged which are not themselves the result of a mainstreaming strategy, but can offer some insight for policymakers wishing to develop mainstreaming strategies.

Table 2. Types of mainstreaming

Type of mainstreaming	Deliberate	De facto or Organic
Discourse	An explicit government vision or strategy for mainstreaming integration policy across government (e.g. National Action Plan on Integration, Germany).	A broader government vision or strategy that implicitly ensures integration policy will be mainstreamed in order to achieve stated goals (e.g. social inclusion and ‘big society’ strategies, United Kingdom).
Governance	Coordination mechanisms between those responsible for integration across government or between government levels (e.g. Transversal Committee of Ministers on Integration, Denmark).	Coordination as a result of pre-existing governance structures and/or shared mandates; or collaboration that occurs on an ad hoc basis (e.g. Urban Contracts for Social Cohesion, France).
Policy	Reform or adaptation of policy as a result of deliberate inclusion of integration priorities (usually led by integration-focused actors).	Reform or adaptation of policy in response to an identified need within a community or group (usually led by mainstream service providers).

Source: Compiled from authors’ research and findings.

A. Mainstreaming through discourse

The presence of a political discourse that aims to mainstream integration policy demonstrates the extent to which certain countries have deliberately expressed their intention to pursue policies to address immigrant integration across government. Denmark and Germany most clearly demonstrate these discourses, as the impetus to mainstream integration policy has been high on the political agenda in these countries, and has resulted in structural change along with new goals and targets.

But the broader political and economic context in every country affects the type of discourse that emerges. In Denmark, mainstreaming integration policy has been a deliberate political decision in both local and central-level discourses and policy measures; while in France and the United Kingdom, the mainstreamed approach toward the immigrant population is a result of de facto political approaches toward ethnicity, diversity, and social cohesion overall. Indeed, given the absence of any narrative regarding either integration policy or mainstreaming in the United Kingdom, it is difficult to assess to what extent mainstream policies have adapted to a diverse society, and to what extent this has been deliberate.

The discourse itself can be a set of political statements, a vision or strategy set out by a ministry or department, or a set of targets and criteria to achieve. It then forms the basis for various governmental (and, where relevant, nongovernmental) actors to divide responsibilities, set internal priorities, and implement policy changes. One of the clearest examples is the development of a comprehensive framework for integration policy at the federal level in Germany, and the publication of a *National Action Plan on Integration* in 2011 by the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration (who works within the Chancellor's office). This action plan sets clear mandates and goals for different ministers, as well as means for measurement and monitoring. It states that the Integration Commissioner will assess and report on the actions taken by all relevant government departments, increasing a sense of shared responsibility (and accountability).²² A number of coordinating mechanisms support the plan's goals, and there are also venues for exchange to facilitate its implementation.

But mainstreaming discourses can also be identified at the local level, even in the absence of a national direction on integration. Indeed, Aarhus and Copenhagen had both developed mainstreaming narratives before the Danish government decided to disperse integration responsibilities across government in 2011. In Aarhus, a decision to overhaul integration policy resulted in a new mainstreamed strategy in 2007, at a time when integration was a contentious political issue at the national level. The core goal of the strategy was:

'To strengthen cohesion ... and ensure that everybody – regardless of ethnic or cultural background – participates as active citizens.... Ethnic minorities must have the same opportunities, rights and duties as other citizens of the city'.²³

In Copenhagen, the strategy 'Engage in CPH' was published in 2011, with the goal of making the city the most inclusive in Europe by 2015; it articulates a number of goals, and sets out an action plan for achieving them.²⁴ In the United Kingdom, a number of towns and localities have developed their own visions for inclusion, in the absence of top-down direction. The One Tower Hamlets strategy developed in the London borough of the same name is an example of this, and encompasses work towards tackling inequality, strengthening cohesion, and building community leadership and personal responsibility.²⁵

Aarhus and Copenhagen had both developed mainstreaming narratives before the Danish government decided to disperse integration responsibilities across government.

Mainstreaming discourses are likely to be more effective if underpinned by political consensus. This seems to be an easier endeavour at the city and local level, where community needs are more keenly felt, as in both Aarhus and Copenhagen. In Berlin and Stuttgart too, city leaders have endorsed integration indicators to allow politicians to monitor progress. This consensus can also occur on a regional and national level. For example, education and inclusion practitioners in Glasgow highlighted that there was an overall consensus within the Scottish government to collaborate on improving the opportunities and outcomes of every child in Scotland, and to mainstream inclusion priorities in all policy areas.

Establishing a strong discourse, and setting out a number of clear objectives, is important for ensuring that all partners have the same understanding of the task at hand. However, a vision is a necessary but insufficient means of mainstreaming: without some form of action plan, coordination mechanism, implementation strategy, or financial support, discourses will render themselves meaningless. A good example here is the United Kingdom's Big Society concept, which was a flagship policy vision of the Conservative Party's platform, and is part of the legislative programme of the coalition government formed in 2010. Though not an integration concept per se, it advocated devolution of social cohesion policy to the local level, and greater activism from community actors to promote community cohesion and reduce inequality. However, the vision itself has not been accompanied by any funding or strategy for implementation, and largely remains on paper and in political debating circles.²⁶

22 Federal Ministry for Education and Research (Germany), 'Integration through Education', accessed 27 February 2014, www.bmbf.de/en/15624.php.

23 Århus Kommune, *Integrationspolitik: Medborgerskab skaber sammenhængskraft* (Aarhus, Denmark: Århus Kommune, 2007), 5, www.aarhus.dk/~media/Dokumenter/Borgmesterens-Afdeling/Kommunikation/Politikker/Integrationspolitik.pdf.

24 Bak Jørgensen, *Decentralising immigrant integration*; City of Copenhagen, Employment and Integration Administration, *Programme For Engage in CPH 2011-2013* (Copenhagen: City of Copenhagen, 2011), www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/cities/news-letter/newsletter13/EngageCPH2011-2013.pdf.

25 See Tower Hamlets, 'Tower Hamlets Partnership', accessed 27 February 2014, www.towerhamlets.gov.uk/lgs/800001-800100/800034_working_for_th/tower_hamlets_partnership.aspx.

26 Vaughan Jones, 'What does Big Society mean for migrant communities?' (Remarks at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) Breakfast Briefing, 11 February 2011), www.compas.ox.ac.uk/events/breakfast-briefings/previous-breakfast-briefings/#c1200.

B. Mainstreaming through government coordination

Integration policymakers working in isolation may have a clear, singular vision of success, but a limited ability to instil large-scale change in society, given the limited remit they have to act. The impetus to develop mainstreaming mechanisms stems from the official political recognition that the integration and inclusion of people with an immigrant background is a shared responsibility and duty of more than one department and governmental level. However, while overly centralised integration policy is self-limiting because it does not allow for flexible responses to divergent policy or local contexts, decentralised integration policy risks chaos. A multiplicity of actors and policy measures may result in the emergence of fragmented and uneven implementation, and thus outcomes. Actors may duplicate or undermine each other's work unknowingly, while missing other unnoticed integration needs. Thus, some form of coordination is necessary for mainstreaming to be successful, and mainstreaming through governance is an emerging trend in all four countries.

Mainstreaming through discourse and governance frequently go hand in hand, as this type of governance is often officially embedded in the government's agenda. For example, Germany's *National Action Plan on Integration* is complemented by an annual conference of the ministers responsible for integration at the state level in Germany (see below), and a formal inter-religious dialogue with Muslim groups (the annual German Islam Conference), managed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior.²⁷

In practice, governmental coordination means that different ministerial departments as well as the national, regional, and local governments increase and improve their collaboration on and development of policies that affect the immigrant population. These can be informal groups of individual policymakers keeping each other informed, or formalised structures with high-level participation and built-in review mechanisms. Most governments have devolved responsibility for integration both across government ministries, and down to authorities at the regional and/or local level. Though integration policy as such is largely absent in the United Kingdom and implemented in a narrow sense in France, both countries mainstream social mobility and social cohesion priorities—which de facto include immigrant integration priorities—through institutionalised horizontal and vertical government collaboration.

1. Horizontal coordination

Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom each engage in some form of institutionalised interministerial collaboration, and these experiences are illuminating for policymakers. The United Kingdom has two interministerial groups to support the country's equality²⁸ and social mobility²⁹ strategies. Both are supported at the highest political level. The Cabinet and Prime Minister's office head the cross-governmental group on equality³⁰ and the Deputy Prime Minister's office heads the social mobility group.³¹ These meet every month, and involve ministers from the major departments.

Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers (published in April 2011) is the United Kingdom's mainstreamed social mobility strategy, meaning that its priorities of raising everyone's opportunities and chances are integrated throughout all government levels and departments. However, the interministerial group on social mobility does not have the competence to draft legislation or carry out policy reforms as such because this is a mandate for ministers, departments, and their respective priorities and responsibilities. Rather, the interministerial group embodies and promotes the institutionalised coordination and collaboration on this mainstreamed political priority at the highest political level. The United Kingdom has also developed Regional Strategic Migration Partnerships (RSMPs), which are examples of cross-government coordination at the regional level. Initially set up as Strategic Partnerships for Asylum and Refugee Support in the early 2000s, their scope widened in 2007 to encompass all migrants. These partnerships include actors from local and regional government and agencies (police, health service, education), representatives from migrant and refugee community organisations, as well as regional representatives of the UK Border Agency. Most partnerships are

27 Deutsche Islam Konferenz (German Islam Conference), 'What is the DIK?', 17 May 2010, www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/DIK/UeberDIK/WasIstDIK/wasistdik-node.html.

28 United Kingdom Government Equalities Office, *The Equality Strategy - Building a Fairer Britain* (London: Government Equalities Office, 2010), www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/85299/equality-strategy.pdf.

29 United Kingdom Cabinet Office, *Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers: A Strategy for Social Mobility* (London: Cabinet Office, 2011), www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61964/opening-doors-breaking-barriers.pdf.

30 GOV.UK, 'Government Equalities Office', accessed 24 February 2014, www.gov.uk/government/organisations/government-equalities-office.

31 GOV.UK, 'Improving social mobility to create a fairer society', 29 April 2013, www.gov.uk/government/policies/improving-social-mobility-to-create-a-fairer-society.

part of regional umbrella organisations of municipalities, or sit with the Mayor's Office in the case of London. Given the regional budget trimming of the current government, some RSMPs are coming to an end.³²

In Denmark, interministerial coordination is still at a nascent stage. The Transversal Committee of Ministers on Integration,³³ created in response to the dispersal of integration responsibilities across government in 2011, consists of nine ministers and is coordinated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. Such coordination is clearly necessary: for example, while the Ministry of Employment is responsible for funding language support, the statistical data to help in this endeavour are collected and retained by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. However, though the committee has launched an overall vision and framework for integration policy, officials of the ministry noted in interviews that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration has few means to motivate other ministries to act, and no enforcement capacity.³⁴

There is a trade-off between formal and informal coordination mechanisms. Institutionalised coordination ensures accountability and creates opportunities to monitor progress across government. Horizontal coordination in Germany and the United Kingdom is characterised by clear institutional mandates and responsibilities, which enable other ministerial departments to design, implement, and monitor policies within this overarching framework. However, overly formal coordination and strict policy parameters may prevent ministries from responding quickly and effectively to new integration needs.

Conversely, informal approaches between policymakers can foster more innovative partnerships and responses to shifting integration priorities, and allow policymakers to collaborate to fill policy gaps. But integration priorities are not of equal significance in every ministry, and mandates can become scattered without enforceable coordination. If responsibility is dispersed across government with no clear leadership, policies will end up languishing on paper. Structures for effective coordination are essential, but policymakers must also find a balance between accountability and flexibility that suit the needs of each ministry, and include the means to incentivise all partners to act.

Informal approaches between policymakers can foster more innovative partnerships and responses to shifting integration priorities.

2. Vertical coordination

National-level coordination between ministries is just one dimension of the challenge. All four countries also apply some form of vertical coordination and governance of integration policy or social cohesion. Such initiatives are not necessarily permanent, and they showcase varying degrees of formality and institutionalisation.

The Danish government created a temporary task force on integration to document and assess integration initiatives and identify best practices on the ground. The task force consists of six members, who represent central government, the municipalities (including a city mayor), the private sector, and NGOs. This task force is an example of how a central government can involve different stakeholders to broaden its pool of information in order to eventually improve policy frameworks and budget more effectively. The task force has presented a report with recommendations for both the national and local levels to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, from which the government will identify priorities during the budget review and publish a policy paper with concrete measures.³⁵ Here, coordination is a process, rather than an institution, and allows the Danish government to bring experts together as needed.

Conversely, the German Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration convenes all integration commissioners of the states and municipalities on an annual basis for the Federal Conference of the Integration Commissioners. The conference and its participants are politically influential and determine the integration policy priorities for each year.³⁶ The 2014 conference will focus on the intercultural/diversity strategy of the Federal Employment Agency.³⁷ This demonstrates the element of multilateral governance in the German approach to integration policy.

³² See Ali and Gidley, *Advancing outcomes for all minorities*.

³³ See Bak Jørgensen, *Decentralising immigrant integration*.

³⁴ Authors' visit to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration in Copenhagen, 28 May 2013.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Authors' visit to the Berlin Senate, 3 June 2013.

³⁷ Ibid.

Despite having very different approaches to inclusion, the governments of France and the United Kingdom employ strikingly similar methods to coordinate social cohesion policy between the central and local level. Both national governments have created a bilateral contractual framework with each local authority. In the United Kingdom, the central government has Local Area Agreements (LAAs) with a number of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs). These, in turn, are coalitions of local service providers in different sectors. The budget accompanying each LAA is determined according to both national priorities and local needs, in the form of 35 priorities selected by local governments; the guidelines from above are broad, and can be implemented more specifically at the local level. The LAA partners meet three to four times a year to identify activities. Because co-financing is almost always obligatory from the local level, strong collaboration between the various stakeholders is necessary.

Similarly, central and city governments in France bilaterally agree upon Urban Contracts for Social Cohesion (CUCS) on the basis of identified social cohesion priorities. The national government allocates a specific budget on the basis of those priorities, which the local government then has an obligation to address. Together with Acsé, the national agency for social cohesion, local authorities design and implement local initiatives within this framework.

In both Britain and France, these vertical governance frameworks are an example of mainstreaming immigrant integration priorities as part of a broader policy strategy: social cohesion initiatives affect those with immigrant backgrounds, but ethnicity³⁸ or origin is not a policy criterion. Instead, policies are pursued according to shared socioeconomic and cohesion challenges within defined urban areas.

Whether the central government applies a more hands-off or more centralised approach toward the local level, local authorities do value at least a minimum level of involvement from the central or regional government, particularly with respect to funding and clear, workable policy frameworks. Too much central government involvement can inhibit progress, but so can too little. In fact, a recurring comment from local actors (both governmental and nongovernmental) has been the need for more financial support and funding (where possible), or for structural support for information exchange from the national government.

Too much central government involvement can inhibit progress, but so can too little.

The bilateral contracts in France and the United Kingdom are useful for setting clear targets and strong collaboration between national and local governments, but one risk is that local authorities have few opportunities to collaborate with each other. For example, local practitioners in London Boroughs highlighted that there is a weak connection between local authorities, and that they operate in isolation. The current British coalition government abolished the sole means for local networking—the Government Office for London—as part of public spending cuts, and a desire to decentralise policy more generally.³⁹ Local authorities and actors often work at the most micro level of policy, and thus can improve the effectiveness of their policies and initiatives by exchanging experiences and engaging in comparative assessment with other practitioners. Central government is in a key position to create, enhance, sustain, and enforce such exchanges and networks.

C. *Mainstreaming through policy measures*

There are many examples of mainstreaming through policy measures, whether directly or indirectly, according to specific needs or political priorities. In practice, this means that the priorities and needs of the population group with an immigrant background become effectively embedded in one or more mainstream policies. Ideally, mainstream public services and systems—including education, employment, health, housing, family, and social support policies—are adapted to serve the needs of the whole of society, including people with a migrant origin.

However, while there is a single objective at the most general level, the means to achieving it will shift according to particular policy goals, political contexts, governance structures, and methods of implementation. The section below

38 In the United Kingdom some of the priorities with the Local Area Agreements (LAAs) may have targets that aim to narrow the gap between socioeconomic or educational outcomes for what is referred to as the 'BME' [Black and Minority Ethnicity] population in general, as well as for the population as a whole. The fact that these are not actual integration measures fits into the British approach to racial equality.

39 Authors' meeting with former Tower Hamlets councilors in London on 18 June 2013. See also: GOV.UK, 'Pickles outlines plans to abolish regional government', 22 July 2010, www.gov.uk/government/news/pickles-outlines-plans-to-abolish-regional-government.

Box 2. Learning example: Bilingual task force in Denmark

In 2008 the Danish government established the Bilingual Task Force (Tosprogs-Taskforce), an initiative by the Education Support Authority under the Ministry of Education. The task force offers instruments, knowledge, and guidance on language learning to schools and municipalities.

The task force focuses on children until the age of 16, creating specific language-learning initiatives. In 2006, 37 per cent of bilingual children in Denmark were leaving school at age 16 without reading skills. This situation may be graver than these numbers imply, because the numbers include EU citizens, who tend to do better after three years than non-Western children, possibly due to the disparities in pre-existing social capital.

In 2012, funding for the initiative was prolonged until 2015. The initiative has 5.5 million euros available for disadvantaged schools over a four-year period. The task force is working closely with 20 municipalities, especially smaller ones with less capacity to implement changes alone. It tries to create a sense of partnership with cities, and focuses on areas that are particularly tough.

Source: Authors' visit to Danish Ministry of Children and Education, 28 May 2013.

highlights a number of practices in the four countries of study that exemplify the different ways in which policymakers can undertake mainstreaming, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. The set of examples are by no means exhaustive or representative of 'ideal' solutions, and there are often limits to their outreach or remit. However, these approaches do illustrate the wide range of policy interventions available within a mainstreamed approach. Further examples can be found in the Migration Policy Institute Europe's forthcoming in-depth country case studies.

1. Direct and indirect mainstreaming

There are numerous advantages to incorporating immigrant integration priorities into other policy fields, but this does not entirely negate the need for specialised services for immigrant groups. Newly arrived immigrants have a range of needs, including language acquisition, credential-recognition support, and access to citizenship. But beyond this, some groups may need long-term support, stretching into the next generation. Refugees often have specific counselling and trauma needs, while immigrant children can have learning difficulties associated with language acquisition. Policymakers from all countries in the study accept that a balance is needed between short-term and longer-term policy interventions.

But targeted measures for immigrants do not need to be separated from broader policy areas. Mainstreaming is a method of institutionalising change; the long-term goal is to ensure immigrant groups are treated equally, and have the same chances as any other member of the population. The best way to ensure this equality of opportunity, however, is to have various agencies target immigrant groups within their own mainstream service provision, rather than leave this work to integration units and departments. As a result, this report makes a distinction between two types of mainstreamed integration measures: those that address immigrant needs directly, and those that affect immigrants indirectly.

Direct mainstreaming of immigrant integration policy occurs when governments explicitly address the specific needs of immigrants within general, mainstream policies.

Indirect initiatives are either tailored investments within mainstream policies to affect a specific group, or they are mainstream policies which are reformed both structurally and holistically to improve the outcomes for vulnerable groups more generally. In other words, these are policies that address socioeconomic characteristics shared by a broad population—such as unemployment, early school leaving, or risk of delinquent activity—but will, in effect, capture a large proportion of the immigrant population, due to the fact that many immigrant groups share many of those characteristics. Thus, immigrants indirectly yet disproportionately benefit from such policy measures.

In contrast, direct mainstreaming of immigrant integration policy occurs when governments explicitly address the specific needs of immigrants within general, mainstream policies. Rather than taking a hands-off approach, mainstreaming of this type involves ensuring that *directly* meeting the needs of immigrant groups is a shared responsibility among mainstream agencies.

This dichotomy is somewhat artificial, and is used here to exemplify the different ways in which mainstreaming interventions can be designed, according to the particular parameters of the mainstream policy at hand. Of course, governments can mainstream both directly and indirectly, and the criteria that are used to guide mainstream policies can be placed on a sliding scale from broad to narrow (see Table 3).

Designing policy measures to support immigrants without explicitly targeting them for intervention can be helpful in a number of ways. First, such approaches recognise that many of the integration challenges are shared within the broader society. While young people with immigrant background frequently find themselves unemployed, there are other groups of young people in the same situation. Tackling youth unemployment in particular neighbourhoods, rather than narrowly addressing immigrant unemployment, allows policymakers to address broader problems with a single measure, rather than sustaining a raft of more tailored approaches with overlapping goals.

Second, this approach reduces the stigmatisation of immigrant groups, and the risk that by identifying immigrant background, governments will reinforce stereotypes and separation. This is a particular challenge when the issues are particularly sensitive for immigrant groups: the British government received a great deal of criticism following the development of a counter-radicalisation strategy that focused on Muslim groups. As a result, the government broadened its target group to one of extremism, to include both far left- and right-wing groups.⁴⁰ Denmark has adopted a similar approach.⁴¹

Finally, overarching measures reassure publics that immigrants are not receiving ‘special treatment’, and reduce the risk of community conflict. At a moment when public budgets are under pressure, it is increasingly difficult for policymakers to tailor initiatives for different categories of groups experiencing exclusion or disadvantage. Thus, greater use of broader initiatives can be a more effective, yet efficient, way of directing limited resources. Many of these policies occur at the local level, where local practitioners are obliged to aim their efforts most strategically and effectively at specific (often area-based) challenges. Nevertheless, certain governments have adopted this approach at all levels. Examples include reframing initiatives so that they include migrant-specific characteristics, and ensuring that initiatives developed to address wider social cohesion issues are reaching immigrant groups.

Policymakers can narrow their target groups using a range of different criteria, all of which have advantages and disadvantages. The examples below highlight that immigrant groups can be targeted by indirect categorisations, and that it is more effective to use a combination of criteria to capture the diversity within the population.

Overarching measures reassure publics that immigrants are not receiving ‘special treatment’, and reduce the risk of community conflict.

Within the *United Kingdom*, Scotland has significantly expanded the role of ‘key workers’ in social work, in order to support a broader range of minors. Key workers are a category of public-sector employees whose work is considered essential to society, such as teachers, clinical staff, and police officers. Key workers are legally mandated⁴² to work with any child that has a need for support, identified through a broad range of criteria. Initially, disability was the only criterion for such support, but in 2004, a legislative act broadened the range of indicators to include other criteria such as mental and emotional well-being and health. As a result, key workers serve a larger number of minors, and are able to reach children with immigrant background on the basis of their need for support, rather than their background. The new legislation follows on from the *Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc. Act 2000*, which stipulates that every child should have the opportunity reach his or her full potential.⁴³ This legislation has a similar point of departure as the United Kingdom’s overall social mobility strategy. Every child under age 5 is appointed a ‘named person’ or health visitor from the National Health Service (NHS); after that age, the head of school becomes the key person, or a lead professional is allocated if necessary. This means that effectively, each child has a guardian angel who can identify individual needs, and take steps to ensure that his or her social, health, education, and pastoral needs are met. In 2014, this practice will become law across Scotland.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ See Ali and Gidley, *Advancing outcomes for all minorities*.

⁴¹ Authors’ visit to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration in Copenhagen, 28 May 2013.

⁴² Under the 2004 *Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act*, which was revised in 2009. For the original act, see: *Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004*, 2004 asp 4. Scottish Parliament, 1 April 2004, www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2004/4/crossheading/main-definitions; and for the 2009 revision, see: *Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2009*, 2009 asp 7. Scottish Parliament, 20 May 2009, www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2009/7/crossheading/additional-support-needs.

⁴³ *Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc. Act 2000*, 2000 asp 6. Scottish Parliament, www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2000/6/crossheading/provision-of-school-education-right-of-child-and-duty-of-education-authority.

⁴⁴ Authors’ meeting with education and inclusion officer from the city of Glasgow, 19 August 2013.

Another example of mainstreaming policies that meaningfully address integration issues can be found in the way the French national agency for social cohesion and equal opportunities, Acsé, functions as the central national management and funding body for initiatives implemented at the local level.⁴⁵ French policy is centralised and implemented top-down. Outside of the narrowly framed integration policy, French policymakers must work through social cohesion, education, and employment policies. Today, Acsé has a territorial remit, operating in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas all over France, within the framework of the priorities identified in the CUCS. Officials identify these disadvantaged areas or ‘priority zones’ according to broader poverty criteria (for example, by measuring unemployment, social housing, income, and the number of youth residents). Acsé does not target people according to ethnicity or migrant origin but in reality, 80 to 90 per cent of programme beneficiaries are people of migrant origin. This is due to the high geographical concentration of immigrant groups in the priority zones.

Table 3. Continuum of indirect to direct mainstreaming policies

Continuum from indirect to direct	Criterion guiding the policy	Pros and cons for reaching immigrant groups
Indirect	Neighbourhood	Allows policymakers to channel additional funding/support to designated disadvantaged localities, and address the needs of immigrants within them. However, disadvantaged immigrants living in undesignated areas will be excluded from programming.
	Employment rate	Allows policymakers to address a specific issue—access to employment—within which immigrant groups are over-represented. However, since it is a broad criterion, these policy measures alone may be too broad to affect immigrant outcomes.
	Income level	Policymakers can identify immigrants according to need, particularly regarding poverty, health, and housing. However, such policies omit immigrants with median and high incomes who may need particular support with respect to language learning or discrimination.
	Educational outcome	Allows policymakers to identify populations according to outcome, rather than background, and address ‘failing’ schools and policies. However, does not often clarify the reasons behind poor outcomes (language needs vs. socioeconomic disadvantage).
	Language needs	Testing for language needs allows policymakers to focus on an identified need, rather than background. However, attention to language needs is only useful in particular policy areas, notably education and employment.
	Ethnic minority status	Uses discrimination and equality as the key indicator, not immigration status or heritage, which can reduce stigmatisation. However, with increasing migration from Central and Eastern Europe, this criterion may miss the needs within the white immigrant population.
	One or more immigrant parents	Includes the second generation within the immigrant target group. However, this may stigmatise second and third generations who are citizens, and capture immigrant descendants who have no integration needs per se.
	Foreign born	One specific way of addressing integration needs through mainstream policies is to directly address the foreign born. However, this misses the second and third generation who may be falling behind.
Direct	Foreign national	Another specific way of addressing integration needs through mainstream policies is to directly address foreign nationals. However, this misses naturalised immigrants, as well as many of the second and third generation.

Source: Compiled from authors’ research and findings.

45 For more detailed information about the role of Acsé, see Escafré-Dublet, *Mainstreaming immigrant integration policy in France*.

France is not the only country that targets localities; the United Kingdom developed a number of area-based Health Action Zones and Education Action Zones to address inequalities in neighbourhoods with persistent poverty and neglect during the 1990s.⁴⁶ But in the French context, area-based interventions are the sole means of addressing social exclusion. In August 2013, President François Hollande announced his intention to inject 5 billion euros into priority neighbourhoods, to generate jobs and improve housing. One of the stated goals of this new proposal is to address immigrant populations within these neighbourhoods, but the pre-existing French framework means that target neighbourhoods will be identified through income.⁴⁷

Acsé is concerned that the remit of the agency's work will be increasingly limited as the number of priority zones are reduced from 2,500 to 1,000; and the criteria for identification is narrowed to the extent that Acsé officials will only be able to tackle unemployment, rather than addressing broader social cohesion, diversity, and education issues.⁴⁸ This demonstrates that focusing on particular neighbourhoods can be useful for targeting activities according to the greatest need, but the process for identifying those localities ought to incorporate a range of criteria to be effective. A sole criterion such as income becomes a blunt instrument, and means that neighbourhoods with a broad range of income (both high and low) will not be identified as disadvantaged, despite containing disadvantaged groups.

In **Germany**, mainstreaming through policy measures has not yet been widely established. This is largely due to the complexity of the federalised government structure, where competences in many policy areas—not least integration and education policies—are decentralised. But it also reflects the relative newness of the German integration policy, in which policies and initiatives are specifically targeted toward those with immigrant background. However, this approach is shifting, particularly within the education system, as policymakers become cognizant of the gap between native and immigrant educational outcomes.

For example, a key education reform has been introduced gradually in all 16 German states over the last decade: compulsory language testing.⁴⁹ Education policy is a state-level competence in Germany, and states have designed their systems independently. However, all 16 states have gradually developed a system to assess the language competences of young children, and identify those who need additional support. In practice, this means that all states test every pupil before enrolment in primary school—though testing methods differ among them.⁵⁰ The tests allow schools to identify German second language learners, as well as those pupils who have learnt German as a first language but have other linguistic problems. The language support interventions that arise from this information may then vary according to state, city, or even school. This policy demonstrates how a common objective in a concrete policy area can lead to a concerted response, even when the federal government has no formal competence to reform policy (in this case, education). The office of the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration supports these measures.

Denmark provides an example of mixing direct and indirect methods of mainstreaming integration, as implemented in the city of Aarhus. The government announced a nationwide objective to enable 95 per cent of all youth to complete upper secondary education by 2015. For Aarhus, this objective is intrinsically linked to the situation of immigrant children, as approximately 20 per cent of schoolchildren in Aarhus speak Danish as a second language, up from 6 per cent in 1989.⁵¹ Thus, in 2005, the city council implemented a policy to redistribute children with significant Danish language support needs to schools outside of their district, to ensure that each classroom contains no more than 20 per cent Danish language learners.⁵² Teachers assess children with immigrant background at the kindergarten and primary school for language proficiency. Since 2006, approximately 3,000 children have been language-screened prior to starting school. Most of the children with language support needs are referred to their district schools, and roughly 600 children have been referred to other schools. A 2010 evaluation found that language and social competencies of referred pupils improved significantly, though the evaluation did not compare progress with nonreferred students. This is an example of how specific targeted measures (namely language testing and referral) can be integrated into broader mainstream policy objectives.

46 See Ali and Gidley, *Advancing outcomes for all minorities*.

47 Sylvie Corbet, 'France injecting 5 billion euros to help stop slow-burning fuse in volatile housing projects', The Associated Press, 2 August, 2013.

48 Authors' meeting with Acsé officials on 1 July 2013 in Paris.

49 Deutscher Bildungsserver (German Education Server), 'Sprachstandserhebung', accessed 24 February 2014, www.bildungsserver.de/Sprachstandserhebung-2301.html; Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany), 'Supporting language skills in early childhood', 18 January 2011, www.bamf.de/EN/Willkommen/Bildung/FruehkindBildung/SprachfoerderungKindheit/sprachfoerderungkindheit.html?nn=1451746.

50 No uniform assessment standard has been developed yet. Comparison and evaluation between the different methods in the states is therefore difficult, but the drivers of this approach are the same. In addition, five out of the 16 states aim the language tests at children of migrant origin specifically, and are therefore not entirely mainstreamed. Michael Becker-Mrotzek et al., *Qualitätsmerkmale für Sprachstandsverfahren im Elementarbereich* (Köln: Mercator Institut für Sprachförderung und Deutsch als Zweitsprache, 2013), www.mercator-institut-sprachfoerderung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Institut_Sprachfoerderung/Mercator-Institut_Qualitaetsmerkmale_Sprachdiagnostik_Kita_Web.pdf.

51 Authors' visit to Aarhus municipality, 29 May 2013.

52 This is a policy option available to all municipalities through national legislation.

Both the German and Danish cases of language testing and support are examples of targeted measures in mainstream policies. Instead of identifying migrant groups per se, policymakers have focused on a specific integration need (Danish or German language proficiency) to improve outcomes for immigrant children, as well as for the education system overall. The sum of the country-specific policy examples here show how policymakers can both directly and indirectly target immigrant groups, or incorporate the particular characteristics of immigrant groups into mainstream policy to address integration needs more precisely.

2. Institutionalising integration priorities

While mainstream policy initiatives can clearly be used to address particular challenges experienced within the immigrant population (and other disadvantaged groups), it is also possible to design mainstreaming policies to introduce a permanent change in the way services are delivered.

The nondiscrimination and equal opportunities framework in the United Kingdom is a pertinent example of this. The first pieces of legislation against discrimination in the United Kingdom were already introduced in the 1960s, but were reformed and solidified in the 2000s. The *Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000* created a statutory duty on public authorities to actively promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people of different racial groups, and to address systemic inequality.⁵³ This was further refined and taken up more broadly by the *Equality Act 2010*.⁵⁴ The Commission for Racial Equality, which was later merged into the Equality and Human Rights Commission, developed detailed guidance for local authorities covering consulting on and assessing the impact of new policies, training staff, procurement, and how to monitor service use. In practice, this legislative framework has enabled local authorities to monitor and measure outcomes for ethnic groups in terms of health, housing, education, and other social policy and generated policy change from major overhauls of information systems to shifts in frontline practice.

Mainstreaming integration policy does not always have to imply a dispersal of integration responsibility, or an absolute withdrawal of targeted measures.

Today, in several German states, almost half of the pupils entering primary school have an immigrant background.⁵⁵ Several states are responding to this increasing diversity in schools. In the state of Baden-Württemberg, the *Migranten machen Schule* project began as a local initiative in 2008, promoting intercultural training in school education to increase the participation of teachers with an immigrant background. It has since expanded across the entire state of Baden-Württemberg.⁵⁶ In the state of North Rhine-Westphalia—the most populated and one of the most ethnically diverse state in Germany—Regional Integration Centres have been established to help education systems adapt to this increased diversity. The first centre was created 35 years ago in the city of Essen, and the state government of North Rhine-Westphalia expanded the initiative to create more than 30 Regional Centres for the Development of Children and Youth of Immigrant Background (*RAA*)—known today as Regional Integration Centres (*Kommunale Integrationszentren*, or KI).⁵⁷ The scope of their work is explicitly migrant- and diversity-oriented: their aim is to bring the specific educational needs of youth with an immigrant background to the attention of mainstream service providers such as schools, kindergartens, and municipalities. They offer training, information sessions, and workshops, and produce leaflets and folders on how to adapt their services. The benchmark for success for these centres is to become obsolete, when all mainstream services have incorporated immigrant priorities into their work. The Regional Integration Centres receive operational funding from both the national and regional level.

Mainstreaming integration policy does not always have to imply a dispersal of integration responsibility, or an absolute withdrawal of targeted measures. Instead, mainstreaming these policies can serve as the *means* through which public services and policies are adapted for a diverse clientele, and as a way to encourage departments and agencies to constructively engage with diversity issues. Targeted measures, used within mainstream policies, can contribute to

53 *Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000*, 2000 Chapter 34, United Kingdom Parliament. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/34/contents.

54 *Equality Act 2010*, 2010 Chapter 15, United Kingdom Parliament, 8 April 2010, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/introduction.

55 Information obtained by authors through conversations with local practitioners in North Rhine-Westphalia (5 June 2013) and Hessen (26 July 2013).

56 For more information see Bendel, *Coordinating immigrant integration in Germany*.

57 Kommunale Integrationszentren Landesweite Koordinierungsstelle (Local Integration Centres Statewide Coordination Agency), Home page, accessed 24 March 2014, www.kommunale-integrationszentren-nrw.de/.

Box 3. Learning example: Mercator Stiftung

Innovative mainstreaming practices outside government can be instructive for policymakers. The Mercator Stiftung, a leading German foundation, embedded immigrant-oriented priorities into mainstream teacher-training practices across North-Rhine Westphalia by engaging individual universities to adopt programming developed in-house.

In 2004, the foundation developed a programme on second-language teaching skills for teachers in training and studied the effects of second-language teaching methods of teachers on the school results of their pupils. By demonstrating that 80 per cent of students had improved results, some even improving by two grades out of six, the Mercator Stiftung convinced universities in North Rhine-Westphalia to incorporate extracurricular tutoring on second-language teaching, with the additional incentive of matched funding from the foundation.

With this experience in hand, the foundation and universities capitalised on the political opportunity presented by the 2008 reform of school curriculums in North Rhine-Westphalia, and successfully lobbied for the introduction of a six-credit point course on German as a second language as a statutory part of the teacher-training curriculum. Today the state government has taken over funding this course as part of the mainstream teacher curriculum, and Mercator is now expanding its approach to other universities outside of North Rhine-Westphalia.

The success of this programme demonstrates how the combination of a solid evidence base, close collaboration with those responsible for outcomes, and the ability to both recognise and capitalise upon political opportunity can be critical for successful mainstreaming. Adding a second-language teaching course to a general teacher-training curriculum is a relatively small adaptation, but with high impact potential for students speaking German as a second language. This case shows that mainstreaming initiatives do not have to originate from within government, but government agencies can play a key role in identifying success, and supporting the growth and expansion of successful measures.

Source: Visit to Mercator Stiftung, Essen, 5 June 2013.

the overall reform and improvement of the broader policy. For example, the development of intercultural competence amongst front-line staff or a strong antidiscrimination framework can improve the outreach and impact of policy on the entire population.

3. Involving third parties

While governments are often seen as the key stakeholders and actors in the design and implementation of integration-related policies, civil-society organisations and private foundations are playing an increasingly important role in a number of countries, particularly at the regional and local level. In the United Kingdom and Germany, charities and foundations have traditionally had a strong foothold in the broad spectrum of social policies, frequently acting as service providers on behalf of government agencies. Many local and regional projects are cofunded and sometimes even initiated by foundations. Governments are cognisant of the expertise within these groups and engage with them deliberately.

A number of projects in the four countries highlight the particular role of civil-society actors. In the United Kingdom, the Young Advisors Charity has 55 teams, and trains young people to become community leaders and help local authorities and others to develop youth-specific policies.⁵⁸ Some of these teams are run by local authorities (as is the case in the London borough of Waltham Forest), and others are run by charities.

Civil society organisations and private foundations are playing an increasingly important role in a number of countries, particularly at the regional and local level.

In Germany, The Mercator Stiftung project was adopted by the regional government and solidified through legislative reform, and the foundation is now promoting this initiative in other states and universities (see Box 3). In France, the goal of local NGOs such as Mozaïk RH (see Box 4) and the Association for the Development of Citizen and European Initiatives (ADICE) is to fill in policy gaps that have emerged within the larger top-down policy framework. These organisations receive funding from a variety of sources, including central and local governments, EU funds, and the private sector.

⁵⁸ For more detail and a list of relevant policy examples, see Ali and Gidley, *Advancing outcomes for all minorities*.

Conversely, in Denmark, the strong ethos that the central government is the main provider for social support, combined with wide-ranging discretion for local authorities as well as substantial government funding, means that foundations and large-scale NGO projects are less prevalent. However, voluntary groups and housing associations have been active in local community activity.

Experts at the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in the United Kingdom highlighted in interviews that maintaining a regular dialogue and exchange has been the key to their successful collaboration with community organisations. This communication is not formalised in an official way, but the relationship is particularly sustained through a steady outreach from the government. In addition, DCLG also encourages collaboration between bigger and smaller organisations by offering funding for civil-society initiatives on the condition that multiple organisations team up.

But NGOs and foundations are not the only actors who can play a role in immigrant integration, and a truly mainstreamed approach should also focus on changing institutions and processes within the private sector. France offers a key example of this. Though the national political and legal framework does not allow for the collection of ethnic data, other tools do help promote diversity in the workplace. The Montaigne Institute, a French think tank, launched a Diversity Charter in 2004—it was the first of several Diversity Charters in Europe.⁵⁹ Thirty-three companies signed the charter, which was supported by French political authorities, but not directed by them.⁶⁰ In 2008, the charter was extended into a Diversity Label awarded by the Ministry of the Interior. The Diversity Charter and Label promote different types of diversity (not just ethnic) and do not focus specifically on people with an immigrant background, though in practice these are expected to be the biggest group of beneficiaries. Participating organisations do not just commit to promoting diversity, but to preventing discrimination: the label is only conferred following a thorough audit of human resource practice and implementation of recommended changes, and regular audits are mandated.

Box 4. Learning example: Mozaïk RH

Mozaïk RH, based in Paris, aims to increase and improve the labour market integration of youth from underprivileged areas—de facto youth of mostly immigrant backgrounds. Within the French political framework, Mozaïk RH cannot tailor services specifically to immigrant youth, and has therefore designed a mainstream policy focusing on youth in the underprivileged banlieues (suburbs) surrounding Paris. While the unemployment rate in disadvantaged areas ('priority zones') is at 26 per cent compared to the 10 per cent national average, youth unemployment is as much as 40 per cent in some neighbourhoods.

The organisation has worked with unemployed young people with a French education and university degrees since 2008. This is a population with potential, but one that likely faces barriers to employment for a number of reasons, not least the spatial and social disconnect between the banlieues and central Paris. In addition, many youngsters lack the professional network and fluency in the unwritten social codes that boost employment prospects. A more prestigious system of schools ('classes préparatoires' and 'grandes écoles') also overshadows degrees from general universities. Finally, these young adults are facing both social and ethnic discrimination on the basis of postcode and name, should it reveal ethnic or immigrant background.

Integration and reception policies in France are too limited to address these specific needs, and the mainstream education system has created considerable deficits in outcome. Few overarching government policies address the particular needs of youth of immigrant origin, apart from national antidiscrimination legislation (which does not cover social background).

Mozaïk RH offers recruitment services to big companies (including GDF Suez, Orange, and Accenture) who wish to diversify their staff. This money is then reinvested in training schemes, workshops, and interview and résumé guidance for young people from disadvantaged areas. Mozaïk RH evaluates and interviews candidates, and prepares them for employment if they lack particular skills. The organisation's official goal is to promote diversity—in practice it focuses on ethnic and immigrant diversity in particular.

Mozaïk RH employees have strong ties with their target neighbourhoods. In 2012, they trained around 800 people, and managed to place more than 500 candidates. Over the past five years, the organisation has secured positions for 1,700 candidates.

The organisation is financially supported by the local government (the region of Ile de France, surrounding departments and city councils), the central government, as well as the European Social Fund. The bulk of the governmental budget that it receives is from social policy funds. This example offers insight into how civil-society organisations can successfully operate within the limits of a policy framework, and how local and central government can support and expand such initiatives without steering away from a set political agenda.

Source: Statistics and information were obtained from Mozaïk RH and the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (Acsé) during authors' visits on 1-2 July 2013. See also Mozaïk RH, 'Social Impact', accessed 24 March 2014, www.mozaiqrh.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15.

59 The voluntary Diversity Charter also exists in other European countries, but few enforcement consequences are tied to signing them: European Commission: Justice, 'Diversity Charters', updated 24 February 2014, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/diversity/diversity-charters/>.

60 French Diversity Charter, 'History', accessed 24 February 2014, www.diversity-charter.com/diversity-charter-history.php.

The initiative was taken up by DAEN, the General Department for Foreigners. The organisation was formerly called *Direction de l'accueil, de l'intégration et de la citoyenneté* (DAIC) and is located within the Ministry of the Interior, which undertakes each audit in collaboration with ministries, five employer associations, trade union representatives, members of the national association of HR managers, and the *Association Française des Managers de la Diversité* (AFMD). Since 2009, the label has been awarded to 392 companies: 340 big companies (including Peugeot/Citroen, BNP, L'Oreal, and AXA), 24 small and medium enterprises (SMEs), seven ministries, two cities (Lyon and Nantes), and two business schools.⁶¹ These policies require little funding from government, yet are effective at encouraging employers to improve the recruitment of workers with immigrant backgrounds. The label utilises public awareness of its brand to encourage compliance.

IV. MAINSTREAMING AND YOUTH POLICY

It is notable that many mainstreaming initiatives (regardless of the actor involved or directness of the approach) are in policy areas that affect young people, particularly education and employment policies.

Over the past several years, as the European economy has stagnated, policymakers have become increasingly concerned about the long-term effects of high rates of unemployment amongst the youth population. There is particular awareness that immigrant youth are over-represented within this group. Policymakers have expressed concern about a number of possible negative impacts: fears that in the short term, unemployment will lead to community tension and increased delinquency leading to criminal and gang-related activity, mid-term apprehension about the scarring effects of unemployment on income levels and career prospects, as well as a long-term worry that the resultant lack of social mobility will be passed on to the next generation.

All four countries have developed initiatives that either supplement mainstream youth policies, or transform and adapt them from within.

Policymakers and academics have highlighted a number of underlying causes of youth unemployment. Some are specifically related to immigrant status, such as deficits in language acquisition leading to poor academic results. For example, in Denmark, high school dropout rates are consistently higher for immigrant groups. In 2005, 38 per cent of males and 28 per cent of females with immigrant background had not returned to complete secondary education ten years after leaving school (the equivalent figure for the overall population is 15 per cent). Other challenges are more connected to socioeconomic conditions than immigrant status, such as for those immigrants who are living in more deprived urban areas, with few prospects for employment—as exemplified by unemployment rates in the suburbs of Paris, Berlin, London, and Copenhagen. Finally, some conditions appear to be systemic (though may not be recognised as such). Discrimination against those with immigrant background can inhibit access to both apprenticeships and full-time employment.

But this is not merely an issue of inequality. The proportion of the under-25 population with immigrant background is increasing. Governments are increasingly aware that the success of society depends on the success of all. As migrant children and youth become an increasing proportion of the total youth population, it is less feasible to talk about targeting policy at a group that has become the majority, particularly in some urban areas—both in terms of cost-effectiveness and outcomes.

All four countries have developed initiatives that either supplement mainstream youth policies, or transform and adapt them from within. While some initiatives are driven by a general framework to improve overall outcomes, others are focused on improving the outcomes of migrant youth specifically. This section highlights mainstreaming practices according to their specific goals for youth of an immigration background.

61 Information obtained from authors' visit to the Department for reception, integration, and citizenship (*Direction de l'accueil, de l'intégration et de la citoyenneté*; DAIC), Ministry of Interior, on 2 July 2013 in Paris. DAIC has been renamed to the General department for foreigners in France (*Direction générale des étrangers en France*; DAEN).

A. Improving educational outcomes

Improving educational outcomes for immigrant children is one of the central policy portfolios where mainstreaming has taken place. There are two levels to such mainstreaming: measures to support immigrant children through the educational system and systemic educational reform. Examples of the former are numerous; the latter is scarce.

One example of systemic reform can be found at the regional level in Germany. Education data demonstrate that, aside from socioeconomic and situational challenges, the school system itself disadvantages children. The German educational system streams children into several tracks at the end of primary school; recent data highlight that while 46 per cent of native students are streamed into the academic (Gymnasium) track, only 23 per cent of foreign-born students are admitted into this track. Additionally, immigrant students have a lower level of graduation, irrespective of the track they are on.⁶² In recognition of this problem, ten out of the 16 *Länder*⁶³ have streamlined the system from three to two tracks, an academic and general one, not only delaying the point at which students are selected but also offering access to tertiary education from both tracks. At the same time, primary and secondary schools across Germany are increasingly being reformed from half-day to all-day schools, recognising the need to offer equal and comprehensive education opportunities and to improve social integration for all children and youth.⁶⁴ All-day schools offer pupils more opportunities to socially interact with one another, more exposure to the language and codes of conduct, and ultimately more chances to integrate in the education system and society overall than half-day schools where the hours of interaction are more limited. In 2003, all-day schools were 16 per cent of all schools; by 2013, that percentage had risen to 51 per cent.⁶⁵ Debate concerning systemic change is not just limited to Germany, and given the increasing number of immigrant students in schools across Europe, further adaptation seems inevitable.

In Denmark, all-day schools have been piloted in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Danish schools usually run to 2 p.m.), in part to offer additional support for children with immigrant background. Additionally, a national programme, Brug For Alle Unge (Need for All Youth), works to prevent early school leaving.⁶⁶ Other examples of reform include language testing and improving the intercultural competences of the teaching staff.

In France, the bulk of Acsé's funding and operations has focused on education and youth.⁶⁷ For example, the Educational Achievement Programme⁶⁸ has supported more than 100,000 pupils between ages 2 and 16 through individualised guidance or support according to the specific social, family, psychological, or health-related barriers to school success they may face. In Germany, the Qualification Initiative for Germany, begun in 2008, is a nationwide initiative to support youth with educational needs, and prevent early school leaving. Within the raft of priorities, policymakers at the regional and national levels have agreed to focus on language learning of children and adolescents, on cooperation between schools and parents, and on intercultural opening of the schools.⁶⁹

B. Improving employment rates

Efforts to address the employment outcomes of immigrant groups are intrinsically linked to their educational outcomes. In several countries, policymakers have focused on the gap between school and work, with the development of 'transit schemes', vocational training, and apprenticeships for disadvantaged youth. The focus here is on those who are out of work, rather than the population as a whole, though both research and policy evaluation highlights that some immigrant groups fare worse than others with respect to employability. Research in France, for example, highlighted that twice as many young people of North African descent were unemployed for three years or more than those with

62 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, *Migration Report 2008*, 3 February 2010, www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2008.html; Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, *Migration Report 2010*, 14 December 2011, www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2010.html.

63 For more information, see Bendel, *Coordinating immigrant integration in Germany*.

64 Nils Berkemeyer, et al. *Chancenspiegel 2013* (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2013), www.chancen-spiegel.de/downloads-und-presse.html?no_cache=1.

65 Ibid; and authors' telephone interview with the Integration and Education Project Manager at Bertelsmann Stiftung, 22 February 2013.

66 Denmark Undervisnings Ministeriet (Ministry of Education), 'Brug For Alle Unge', accessed 24 February 2014, www.brugforalleunge.dk/.

67 L'Acsé, *Programmes des interventions* (Paris: L'Acsé, 2013), www.lacse.fr/wps/wcm/connect/ff679b804e4cc66f895889d921badb2a/Programme_des_interventions_Acse_2013.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ff679b804e4cc66f895889d921badb2a.

68 L'Acsé, *Créer les conditions de la réussite* (Paris: L'Acsé, 2011), www.lacse.fr/wps/wcm/connect/f0ea4d00497b26b3bdf3bfe-f40a0f24d/Guide_education_oct_2011_BD.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=f0ea4d00497b26b3bdf3bfe-f40a0f24d.

69 See Bendel, *Coordinating immigrant integration in Germany*.

both parents born in France.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, a review of UK policy noted that young black men, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, and poor white groups fare worse in the labour market.⁷¹

Several national schemes, such as the Danish ‘Retention Caravan’ (now ended), sought to encourage young people to complete vocational training. This particular project is closely linked to the Brug for Alle Unge project, which focuses on helping young people complete a secondary education. In the United Kingdom, the Youth Contracts initiative offers additional support for unemployed 18- to 24-year-olds and subsidies for small businesses that are willing to take on 16- to 24-year-olds as apprentices.⁷²

Regional and local authorities in all four countries under study have also developed a myriad of employment strategies and microprojects to support disadvantaged youth access to apprenticeships and internships. A good example of municipal mainstreaming in this regard is the Berlin Senate’s employment strategy of 2011-16.⁷³ One of the key action points of this strategy is the improved integration of migrants into the labour market, which includes training programmes, counselling centres, and a headline programme to improve public-sector employment of migrants. In the United Kingdom, local authorities run Connexions, which are youth employability programmes initially funded by and coordinated at the national level.

A combination of approaches is necessary to both prepare immigrants for the labour market, and improve attitudes toward immigrant groups within the labour market.

While Denmark offers a great deal of employment support for youth, much of this activity also happens at the local level. In fact, there is little evidence that national policymakers believe discrimination is a problem. City-level officials in both Aarhus and Copenhagen highlighted that discrimination is taken more seriously at the local level. By contrast, the national government in France places particular emphasis on discrimination in the labour market, evidenced by the use of the Diversity Label. Overall, the experiences of Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have suggested that, in order to mainstream effectively to improve employment outcomes, a combination of approaches is necessary to both prepare immigrants for the labour market and improve attitudes toward immigrant groups within the labour market.

C. Increasing participation in the local community

Community participation can take a number of forms, and policies uncovered during the study include local community leadership efforts and improved representation of immigrant groups in government.

Part of improving participation is ensuring that policy is responsive to on-the-ground needs. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Youth Engagement Strategy of Waltham Forest Council⁷⁴ demonstrates how immigrant priorities can be incorporated into local policy agendas through the development of local outreach and advisory groups. This London borough sponsors the Young Advisors and the Youth Independent Advisory Group, two specific initiatives that aim to engage, train, and empower youth to involve them in the local decisionmaking process, and ensure that those policies are ‘youth friendly’. The city council had specific goals, such as reducing negative experiences of police ‘stop and search’ policies. By developing a group of young people who can serve as liaisons between government and community and as role models for other youth, local officials can ensure they are reaching the whole community, and respond when problems emerge. This is key in a locality such as Waltham Forest, where the community is extremely

70 Dominique Meurs, Ariane Pailhé and Patrick Simon, ‘Mobilité intergénérationnelle et persistance des inégalités: l’accès à l’emploi des immigrés et de leurs descendants en France’, *Population* (Edition française) 61 no. 5/6 (2006): 763-801.

71 United Kingdom Cabinet Office, *Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers: A Strategy for Social Mobility: Update on progress since April 2011* (London: Cabinet Office, 2012), www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221007/HMG_SocialMobility_acc.pdf.

72 Education Funding Agency, ‘Local Authority Roles in the Youth Contract for 16-17 Year Olds’ (paper, Education Funding Agency, Department for Education, Coventry, January 2013), <http://media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/pdf/1/local%20authority%20roles%20in%20the%20youth%20contract%20for%2016-17%20year%20olds.pdf>.

73 Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit, Integration, und Frauen (Berlin Senate Administration for Integration, Employment, and Women), ‘BerlinWorks: Strategic Realignment of the Labour Market and Vocational Education Policies of the State of Berlin in the Legislative Period 2011 – 2016’ (Berlin: Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit, Integration, und Frauen, 2012), www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/sen-arbeit/besch-impulse/berlinarbeit_eng.pdf?start&ts=1351241878&file=berlinarbeit_eng.pdf.

74 Authors’ meeting with youth officials from Waltham City Council, 17 July 2013.

diverse, and the white British community is in the minority (38 per cent in 2014); other significant groups include residents of Central European origin (who are less likely to be included in ethnic minority strategies) and residents of Pakistani origin.⁷⁵

Other localities have made efforts to improve immigrant representation in public services. The Berlin braucht dich! (Berlin needs you!) campaign is designed to redress the currently low numbers of immigrant employees in the city.⁷⁶ Officials noted that this was a legacy problem, stemming from the merger of two administrations following the removal of the Berlin Wall; recruitment was only on a replacement basis for many years. As the number of public-sector staff reaching retirement accelerates, this is not just a representation issue, but one of overall staffing needs. The programme began in 2006, and the proportion of migrants in public-sector training had doubled to reach 14.3 per cent by 2008.⁷⁷ The current goal is to increase representation to a total of 25 per cent by 2015.

Elsewhere in Germany, immigrant representation in the teaching field is a primary goal of the National Integration Strategy: officials in the Federal Commissioner's Office highlighted that while immigrant children comprise 25 per cent of the classroom, just 6-7 per cent of the teachers have an immigrant background. In Denmark, efforts have been made to increase the recruitment of ethnic minorities to the police force, not least to improve community relations in municipalities. For example, the National Commissioner of Police financed a mentoring initiative to improve recruitment rates, while a local-level recruitment campaign began in Copenhagen.⁷⁸ Despite this, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressed concern at the high numbers of those from ethnic minority backgrounds who either fail the recruitment test or drop out of police training colleges prior to graduation.⁷⁹

D. Preventing delinquency

Participation in local community activities and policymaking goes hand in hand with measures to address youth deemed to be at risk of delinquency, criminality, gang-related activity, and even extremist activity.

At the local level, there are a number of grassroots initiatives designed to address youth participation in the community.

In Germany, the Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen, und Jugend (Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth) manages a range of nationally funded programmes, implemented at the regional and local level, to address the exclusion of disadvantaged youth ages 12 to 27. Jugend Stärken (Youth Strength) is one such initiative which consists of four programmes, three of which are partially funded by the European Social Fund. These three programmes provide individual sociopedagogical assistance at approximately 370 locations throughout Germany to youth under the age of 27 who are experiencing problems such as homelessness, drug addiction, family isolation, or truancy. All four of the programmes develop individual plans to foster integration into society or the labour market. The fourth programme, Jugendmigrationsdienste (Youth Migration Services), is nationally funded and offers support to young people with an immigrant background concerning specific immigration-related issues. They cooperate closely with the other programmes of the Jugend Stärken initiative. As a whole, the set of programmes is a prime example of Germany's effort to target immigrant groups within a broader framework of mainstreamed activities.

At the local level, there are a number of grassroots initiatives designed to address youth participation in the community. An interesting facet of these projects is that they have tended to emanate from the community itself (through self-starting individuals or NGOs, and that several of them have actually broadened out from an original migrant focus to address wider community issues. A key example of this is the Youth4Youth project in Aarhus, Denmark. The group

75 Waltham Forest, 'Statistics about the Borough', updated 4 March 2014, www.walthamforest.gov.uk/Pages/Services/statistics-economic-information-and-analysis.aspx.

76 Authors' meeting with Berlin Senate representatives, 3 June 2013.

77 European Commission, 'Berlin Needs You!' accessed 27 February 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/practice/details.cfm?ID_ITEMS=13081.

78 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 'Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Denmark' (CERD/C/DEN/18-19, 31 August 2009, Geneva), www.refworld.org/docid/4c84de182.html.

79 CERD, 'Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Denmark', CERD/C/DNK/CO/18-19 (Geneva: CERD, 2010), para 11, <http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhstNvdqIswU%2fbIKYXnDigeHpVFcrXwG9vyb8skZwazlyyx9XIR3T8Hhf%2f1JVK%2bU2%2fRGQyLt18zoq85ABYq3gHZuTzv1wVZTkmrnghHPIJUL5t8kuFj9WzZRGAA%2b8lJMASGqg%3d%3d>.

was initiated in 2001 by Somali youths wishing to respond to the increasing incidence of petty crime and vandalism and the high levels of unemployment in the highly diverse suburb of Gellerup. Youth4Youth is a network of role models who base their work on two Somali values: first, the clan raises the children; second, don't give up on each other. The success of the project was evident in the significant drop in crime rates. The project gradually expanded to include 20 other nationalities, which broadened the geographic focus to include native Danish. There is a reward system within the network: working for the network can be an alternative to prison, and the volunteering participants can use the network to demonstrate change and growth. Currently the network is expanding beyond Gellerup.

V. DESIGNING A MAINSTREAMED APPROACH

A. *The risks and opportunities of mainstreaming*

Mainstreaming presents a high-potential opportunity for policymakers who wish to ensure that integration outcomes for immigrant groups improve at a time when integration policies themselves are under pressure. However, it also poses a number of risks to effective governance. This section outlines some of the pros and cons.

One of the core advantages is that mainstreaming can ensure a more sustainable approach to integration. If embedded permanently across government, integration as a topic becomes less susceptible to negative political debate or budgetary fluctuations. This is not foolproof; despite the fact that integration priorities have always been mainstreamed into UK policy on social cohesion, national and local policymakers have come under pressure to reduce services for disadvantaged groups as the government advocates for community self-help. However, once a range of policy actors are engaged and committed to the priorities set out through integration strategies, integration as a policy portfolio becomes less fragile.

One of the biggest potential advantages of mainstreaming is that public services systems will themselves adapt to better serve a diverse society.

A second advantage is that mainstreamed approaches can more easily respond to need, rather than background. This allows governments to focus on the parts of the community that need the most help, rather than adopt a blanket approach that targets all immigrants. Third, bringing immigrants into mainstream services at the earliest opportunity is a way to avoid the long-term segregation and stigmatisation of immigrant groups, and also gives policymakers the impetus to look at communities as a whole, and treat minorities equally.

One of the biggest potential advantages of mainstreaming is that public services systems will themselves adapt to better serve a diverse society, managing to address differentiated needs while providing consistently high levels of service. Currently, this opportunity has yet to be realised. There is evidence of small-scale systemic adaptation—the Equality Standard in the United Kingdom, for example, and the German regions that have shifted from a three-track to two-track schooling system—but for the most part mainstreaming has manifested itself through increased coordination and through the proliferation of measures capable of addressing the needs of immigrants.

However, discussions with policymakers illuminate their concerns about the potential risks that mainstreamed approaches may pose to effective policymaking, particularly in the early stages. Much of this is related to coordination. Danish policymakers in particular highlighted that the dispersal of responsibilities across government in 2011 has meant that it is not always clear whom, in which department, is responsible for particular policy tasks. This is also the case for local administrators who are not sure who to contact at the national level. This is likely to be a short-term issue as the changes are recent, but a serious one nonetheless.

A second concern, highlighted in several countries, is that mainstreaming could become an excuse for policymakers to avoid taking responsibility for integration priorities. One of the criticisms of the United Kingdom's Big Society concept is exactly this: the shift to localism and self-sufficiency, without a clear strategy, has allowed the national government to abstain from setting its own integration goals. French practitioners at l'Acsé have also highlighted that they

have little leverage to ensure that integration goals are prioritised within social inclusion strategies, when there are so many other competing priorities.

Finally, one of the biggest challenges for policymakers is generating evidence that mainstreamed approaches are actually achieving their goals of better outcomes for immigrants. Policymakers in all four countries highlighted the challenges of evaluating practices even when target groups are identifiable and data plentiful, and pointed out that such a task is near impossible in a context of mainstreamed approaches and limited data on groups (a particular problem in France).

B. Policy considerations

This report highlights that knowledge and learning about mainstreamed practices are still at a nascent stage. As such, it would be presumptuous to proscribe a list of best practices. However, it is clear from the analysis that, when designing a strategy for mainstreaming immigrant integration, there are a number of elements that policymakers should take into account.

One of the biggest challenges for policymakers is generating evidence that mainstreamed approaches are actually achieving their goals of better outcomes for immigrants.

1. Tailor to context

Mainstreamed initiatives ought to be shaped to fit the existing governance structures, empirical realities, and political narratives. None of the examples contained in the report can be transferred wholesale into another jurisdiction. Instead, policymakers should examine existing practices, distill key lessons from them, and adapt them to the desired context.

2. Clear goals

Mainstreaming is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Limited financial resources or broad policy shifts can be impetus for mainstreaming, but cannot be the core goal. Thus, in order to define success, policymakers must establish clear objectives within each policy area. If goals are clearly set, policymakers will more easily evaluate and assess whether progress has been made, and how a working method can be improved. An example of this can be found in the German National Integration Plan, which sets out a series of objectives, and identifies those responsible for them. A review of progress, due to take place in 2014, will monitor outcomes.

When asked, policymakers should be able to answer the question of *why* they want to mainstream integration policy in a particular area, and the benefits they foresee. Danish policymakers at both the central and local level have taken this reasoning to heart. Their overall goal is to make society more inclusive and to improve everyone's opportunities and outcomes, and the visions articulated at the municipal level are detailed. However, this also means that the decision *not* to mainstream must remain a possibility. In all four countries, examples of targeted integration initiatives can be found, when mainstreamed approaches have been deemed insufficient.

3. Build political will

Strong political support and, where possible, consensus is important to ensure that mainstreamed approaches develop, as policymakers will need to be open to adapting their policies and absorbing integration priorities into their agendas. In addition, political consensus can lead to the creation of formal mandates, and serve to enforce particular policy objectives.

There are limits to political leadership, however, particularly if focused in a particular individual or department, such as a mayor's office. Policymakers within this study highlight that elections and frequent change of leadership can inhibit the consistent application of mainstreaming approaches. Integration is a long-term process; initiatives must be based on broad political patronage if they are to be sufficiently sustainable.

4. Invest wisely

Austerity and limited budgets have greatly affected the scope of existing policies, and integration policy has been no exception. In the near- to mid-term future, governments are likely to continue looking for more ways to save money. Thus, it is crucial to look for ways to invest wisely and design self-sustaining structures.

Many initiatives outlined in this study have been supported with significant financing. This allows policymakers to absorb new priorities, without compromising existing services. The federal government in Germany is funding the Qualification Initiative for Germany to the tune of 6.5 billion euros, while regional governments have also agreed to raise investments in education, which allows policymakers to incorporate immigrant priorities. This is sustainable funding, as the investments are for infrastructural change, rather than stand-alone, short-term initiatives.

It is crucial to look for ways to invest wisely and design self-sustaining structures.

At the other end of the scale, there is evidence of community work that has been both sustainable and low-cost. Both Denmark and the United Kingdom have several local initiatives where local young volunteers are involved in community projects that require little investment to maintain. Indeed, the sole Aarhus government expenditure into Youth4 Youth is currently one salary for the coordinator of the network (himself a former network member), which consists of 100 role models serving in three to four networks, and addressing 400 youths in crime. Funding or otherwise supporting small-scale effective initiatives can be a way of wisely investing limited resources, rather than having to design large-scale programmes. In fact, local and grassroots-level actors highlighted that government agencies are not needed to inspire and design initiatives, as long as they are capable of recognising valuable local initiatives and offering support on a long-term basis.

And finally, there are some examples of innovative and self-sustaining funding models. Mozaïk RH in France uses the profits from its work advising companies on recruitment to support its nonprofit work to develop the employment potential of disadvantaged youth. Initiatives such as these deserve further study to see how governments might be able to emulate the cost-neutral outcomes.

5. Collaborate strategically

Mainstreaming immigrant integration priorities into other policy areas requires a minimum amount of institutionalised collaboration between departments and government levels. In France, where there is no formalised horizontal coordination between ministries on immigrant integration (even if different departments and ministries may have a mandate on it), practitioners have confirmed that it is difficult not only to stay informed about other departments' activities, but also to persuade them to act. In Germany, where the bulk of the mainstreaming happens through formal government structures, information exchange is more consistent. However, coordination mechanisms need to be designed to fit the existing government context, and method of working. A review of existing national coordination mechanisms can be helpful in this regard.

In addition, collaboration does not always have to happen within and between government levels. Civil-society organisations tend to have been founded in response to a defined (often local or regional) need. These organisations often have a strong foothold in the local community, and an excellent understanding of the needs and challenges on the ground. Teaming up with such relevant partners can offer policymakers more credibility, ensure that the policy is responsive to changing needs on the ground, and encourage more effective outcomes.

6. Ensure coherent, shared responsibility

In addition to navigating communication with collaborators, integration policymakers will have to give thought to two intertwined challenges: first, how to incentivise colleagues to prioritise integration within their portfolios, and second, how to ensure an ultimate responsibility and accountability for delivering outcomes.

Political consensus is clearly key to motivating ministries and departments, but may not be sufficient without additional stimulus. At the beginning of the process, integration policymakers must make the case for mainstreaming across government, by collecting and presenting the available evidence to demonstrate that, not only will outcomes improve for immigrants, but that ministries can expect overall improvements in policy effectiveness. Once the political case has been made, then mainstreaming can be supported through the creation of a regular coordinating and reporting mechanism, identification of points of contact in each ministry and department, and the development of a data collection and monitoring system to follow up on outcomes. A single point-of-contact for coordinating and fostering communication, ideally within the integration department itself, must have teeth to respond should one or more partners fail to deliver.

7. Use data effectively

As the concept of mainstreaming integration policy is still in a fairly early stage in most countries, comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies is lacking, particularly in a comparative context. This also applies to the examples discussed in this report. They do not represent a comprehensive list of success policies or best practices, but offer policymakers a sampling of different, relevant approaches. Despite differing contexts and the lack of consistent evaluation mechanisms, important lessons—both good and bad—can be drawn from each initiative discussed in this report, and those contained in the country reports.

As the concept of mainstreaming integration policy is still in a fairly early stage in most countries, comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies is lacking.

But in order to evaluate policies and outcomes, policymakers must first be able to draw on a solid evidence base. In all of the countries studied, data collection was considered to be a particular area of weakness, particularly at the local level. Without real understanding of the challenges faced in particular towns and communities, it will be difficult to both design effective interventions, and assess their effects on sections of the population. This is especially relevant for migrant groups. When a policy is mainstreamed, specific data on immigrants is important for ensuring that they are being reached and served by the new policies.

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